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The Use and Misuse of the Business Judgment Rule in
the Close Corporation
Ralph A. Peeples*

The business judgment rule occupies a venerable position
among corporate law principles. The rule is uniformly noted in
major law school casebooks and hornbooks a and is cited frequently
by the courts.2 The business judgment rule invariably appears in
any distillation of general corporate law. 3 However, this piece of
"black letter law" is under assault today from courts and commentators alike. 4 Critics have questioned both the vitality and validity
of the rule. The challenges have been sporadic and less than successful, but persistent nonetheless.
This article explores the application of the business judgment
rule in the context of the close corporation. Part I describes the
operation of the business judgment rule and the rule's premises.
Part II examines and questions the assumptions and functions of
the rule as it is applied to the closely held corporation. Part III
considers alternatives to the business judgment rule.
I. The Business Judgment Rule in Theory and Practice
A.

Formulations, Confusion, andJustifications

Although arguably codified by the Model Business Corporation Act,5 the business judgment rule is derived from the common
*

Associate Professor, Wake Forest University School of Law; B.A. 1973, Davidson

College; J.D. 1976, New York University Law School.
1 See, e.g., H. BALLANTINE, BALLENTINE ON CORPORATIONS 161 (1946); W. CARY & M.
EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 537-53 (5th ed. 1980); 3A W.
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1039 (rev. perm. ed.
1975); R. HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 695-714 (2d ed. 1981); H.

HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 661-63 (3d ed. 1983); 1 G. HORNSTEIN,
CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 437 (1959).
2 See, e.g., cases collected in W. FLETCHER, supra note 1; H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, supra
note 1; G. HORNSTEIN, supra note 1.

3 See notes 1-2 supra. The importance of the business judgment rule is reflected in the
efforts of the American Law Institute to draft a codification of the rule to function as a "safe
harbor" for officers and directors. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1984) comment to § 4.01(d) at 54-55 [hereinafter
cited as PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNANCE].
4 See notes 58-78 infra and accompanying text.
5 The relevant portion of the Act provides:
A director shall perform his duties as a director, including his duties as a
member of any committee of the board upon which he may serve, in good faith, in
a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and
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law. 6 Justice Brandeis recognized and described the rule in 1917. 7
Various commentators have traced the use of the rule to the late
nineteenth century, 8 and possibly even to the Civil War era. 9
In its narrowest form, the business judgment rule determines
judicial conduct.' 0 Application of the rule requires judicial deference to corporate decisions and thus non-interference by the
court." Not surprisingly, confusion has arisen about the proper
application of this frequently used rule. The countless formula2
tions have caused uncertainty about the rule's contents.'
For example, the rule is commonly described as insulating corporate directors and officers from personal liability' 3 or as
"validat[ing] corporate dealings."' 4 Other descriptions are more
extreme. Consider, for example, the remarks of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court over one hundred years ago in Spering's Appeal:
"[Directors] are not liable for mistakes of judgment, even though
they may be so gross as to appear to us absurd and ridiculous, provided they are honest and provided they are fairly within the scope
with such care as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under
similar circumstances.
MODEL BusINESS CORP. ACT § 35 (1979).
See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 35 (1977 Supp.); Arsht & Hinsey, Codified Standard-Same Harbor But Charted Channe" A Response, 35 Bus. LAw. 947, 948 (1980). But see
PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, noting that "[there are no statutory formulations
of the business judgment rule." Id. comment to § 4.01 (d) at 54.
6 PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, comment to § 4.01(d) at 54; Arsht, The
BusinessJudgnent Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93 (1979).
7 Justice Brandeis stated:
Whether or not a corporation shall seek to enforce in the courts a cause of action
for damages is, like other business questions, ordinarily a matter of internal management and is left to the discretion of the directors, in the absence of instruction
by vote of the stockholders. Courts interfere seldom to control such discretion
intra vires the corporation, except where the directors are guilty of misconduct
equivalent to a breach of trust, or where they stand in a dual relation which prevents an unprejudiced exercise of judgment ....
United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263-64 (1917).
8 See, e.g., Note, The Continuing Viability of the BusinessJudgment Rule As A Guide ForJudicial
Restraint, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 562, 565-56 (1967).
9 Arsht, supra note 6, at 98-99.
10 Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259, 270
(1967); Note, supra note 8, at 564-65.
11 H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 661, n.4; Fischel, The Race to the Bottom
Revisted, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 913, 937 (1982); Hetherington & Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A ProposedStatutory Solution to the Remaining Close CorporationProblem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1, 39
(1977); Manne, supra note 10, at 271.
12 PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, comment to § 4.01(d) at 54; Arsht, supra
note 6, at I11; cf. the cases collected in W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 1.

13 See Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 274 (3d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979). See also Arsht, supra note 6, at 95.
14 Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 341 F. Supp. 240, 243 (D. Neb. 1972), a d, 473 F.2d
537 (8th Cir. 1973).

[Vol. 60:456

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

of the powers and discretion confided to the managing body."' 5
The Delaware courts have often stated that a showing of "gross and
palpable overreaching" would be necessary to prevent the application of the business judgment rule.16
The many versions of the rule' 7 and the resulting confusion
have not gone unnoticed. Both commentators and courts have deplored the inexact and expansive language that frequently is used
to describe the purposes and functions of the business judgment
rule.' 8 The Delaware Supreme Court recently acknowledged that
the Delaware cases describing the rule have been imprecise and
19
have contributed to confusion and to misuse of the rule.
15 71 Pa. 11, 24 (1872).
16 See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Co. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 722 (Del. 1971); Meyerson v. El
Paso Natural Gas Co., 246 A.2d 789, 794 (Del. Ch. 1967). See also Arsht, supra note 6, at
102-06. The "gross and palpable overreaching" standard has been borrowed by other
courts as well. See, e.g., In re Reading Co., 711 F.2d 509, 520 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'g 551 F.
Supp. 1205 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
17 Many versions of the business judgment rule are presently in circulation. They illustrate the ambiguities the rule embodies. Compare, for example, the following descriptions:
[A] court will not disturb the judgments of a board of directors "if they can be
attributed to any rational business purpose."
E.

FOLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL COPORATION LAW

75-77 (1972).

[T]he law will not hold directors liable for honest errors, for mistakes ofjudgment,
when they act without corrupt motive and in good faith, that is, for mistakes which
may properly be classified under the head of honest mistakes. And that is true
even though the errors may be so gross that they may demonstrate the unfitness of
the directors to manage the corporate affairs. This rule is commonly referred to as
the "business judgment rule".
W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 1039.
If in the course of management, directors arrive at a decision, within the corporation's powers (intra vires) and their authority, for which there is a reasonable basis,
and they act in good faith, as the result of their independent discretion and judgment, and uninfluenced by any consideration other than what they honestly believe to be the best interests of the corporation, a court will not interfere with
internal management and substitute its judgment for that of the directors to enjoin
or set aside the transaction or to surcharge the directors for any resulting loss.
H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 661.
(d) A director or officer does not violate his duty under this Section with respect
to the consequences of a business judgment if he:
(1) was informed with respect to the subject of the business judgment to the
extent he reasonably believed to be appropriate under the circumstances;
(2) was not interested in the subject of the business judgment and made the
judgment in good faith; and
(3) had a rational basis for believing that the business judgment was in the
best interests of the corporation.
PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, § 4.01(d).
18 Arsht, supra note 6, at 95, 100-02; Manne, supra note 10, at 270; Note, supra note 8,
at 562. The draft comment to § 4.01 (d) contained in PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNANCE, simply

notes that "judicial formulations of the rule have varied."

PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNANCE,

supra note 3, comment to § 4.01(d) at 54.
19 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 n.6 (Del. 1984). Compare the director's Foreword to PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNANCE, which acknowledges that "there is a school of thought
that holds it unwise to try to state the content of the business judgment rule, taking the view
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Consensus as to the effect of the rule is easier to establish than
is agreement about the circumstances which trigger the rule's application. Application of the rule results in judicial deference to corporate decisions satisfying the particular court's criteria for the
rule's invocation. 20 In practice, the rule operates as a rebuttable
21
presumption in favor of the corporation's officers and directors.
Disagreement and confusion arise over the criteria required to
trigger the rule. "Independence," "good faith," "informed judgment," and "rational basis" appear frequently as requirements for
applying the rule, but usually are not defined. 22 Requirements to
defeat the presumption, such as a showing of "gross and palpable
overreaching" 23 or of "clear and gross negligence," 24 occasionally
appear as well. The requirements are sometimes stated in negative
terms: the business judgment rule may be invoked "in the absence
of evidence of bad faith, fraud, conflict of interest, or illegality." 25
Both courts and commentators have noted this definition problem. 26 In Aronson v. Lewis, 2 7 the Delaware Supreme Court attempted to restate the rule and its function:
It is a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith
and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interests of the company. Absent an abuse of discretion, that
judgment will be respected by the courts. The burden is on the
party challenging
the decision to establish facts rebutting the
28
presumption.
The Aronson court recognized significant limitations to the rule.
First, the rule protects only "disinterested" directors; thus, inthat the inherent tendency of such articulation is to point toward narrowing its exculpative
scope." PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, Foreword at vii.
20 See note 17 supra. Whether approached from the standpoint of exoneration, e.g., the
approach taken in § 4.01 (d) of PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNANCE, supra note 17, or a reluctance to
interfere with or second-guess the decisions of management, see, e.g., H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, supra note 17, the effect is the same.
21 Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1092 (1981); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); Arsht, supra note 6, at 13033; Lynch, The Business Judgment Rule Reconsidered, 17 FORUM 452 (1981).
22 See H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 661-62; cf. the cases collected in PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, reporter's note at 70. See also Casey v. Woodruff, 49
N.Y.S.2d 625, 643 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
23 See note 16 supra.
24 N. LATrIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 274 (1971).
25 Cohn, Demise of the Director's Duty of Care: JudicialAvoidance of Standards and Sanctions
Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 591, 594 (1983).
26 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 n.6 (Del. 1984); PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNANCE,
supra note 3, comment to § 4.01(d) at 55; Arsht, supra note 6, at 93-94; Manne, supra note
10, at 270-81.
27 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
28 Id. at 812.
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dependent judgment is assumed. 29 Second, the rule protects only
directors who make informed decisions based on all available material information.30 Third, the rule protects only "decisions." The
business judgment rule does not shield dereliction of duty.31 The
limitations noted in Aronson are hardly revolutionary. 32 The court's
recognition of these restrictions, however, is significant.
Where corporate actions satisfy these criteria, the business
judgment rule has a significant result: a relaxed standard of review.
The Aronson court "predicated [liability] on a standard which is less
exacting than simple negligence." 33 Conduct equivalent to "gross
negligence" would have to be established to defeat the presumption.34 Thus, under the Aronson restatement, the business judgment
rule functions as more than a rebuttable presumption or a rule of
judicial behavior. The rule also establishes a standard of conduct
35
for officers and directors.
As Aronson suggests, applying the business judgment rule adversely affects a plaintiffs chance for success. Plaintiffs therefore
typically strive to avoid the presumption. 36 The most common rebuttal to a defendant's reliance on the business judgment rule is an
allegation of lack of independence, usually a claim that the defendant had an "interest" in the transaction.37 "Interest" quite often
translates into "self dealing." When interest is established, the burden shifts to the defendant to establish the "intrinsic fairness" of
the challenged transaction.3 8 Thus, the presence of interest pre29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 813.
32 Very similar criteria, for example, were applied forty years earlier in Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625, 642-47 (Sup. Ct. 1944). See also Arsht, supra note 6, at 111-12; Arsht
& Hinsey, supra note 5, at 958-62. Section § 4.01(d) of PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNANCE, supra
note 17, is also quite similar.
33 473 A.2d at 812 n.6.
34 Id. at 812. The appropriateness of a standard less exacting than a simple negligence
standard has been questioned. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 299300 (7th Cir.) (Cudahy, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Cary & Harris,
Standards of Conduct Under Common Law, Present Day Statutes and the ModelAct, 27 Bus. LAw. 61,
66 (1972). See generally Cohn, supra note 25.
35 See, e.g., Manne, supra note 10, at 270-73. Note, supra note 8, at 564. Although labeled as a "safe harbor," the ALI's draft § 4.01(d) in PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNANCE, also has
the effect of establishing a minimum level of directorial conduct. See note 17 supra.
36 See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 11, at 39 (plaintiffs likely to prevail only when
"management conduct deviates from accepted business norms by a very wide margin"). See
also Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885-86 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983);
Lewis v. S. L. & E., Inc., 629 F.2d 764, 768-69 (2d Cir. 1980).
37 For example, an allegation of "interest" on the part of the board of directors usually
underlies a derivative plantiff's claim that demand on the board of directors should be excused as futile. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
38 See In re Reading Co., 711 F.2d 509, 517-18 (3d Cir. 1983); Treadway Cos. v. Care
Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980); Lewis v. S. L. & E., Inc., 629 F.2d at 768, rev'" 551
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vents the application of the rule because " 'the business judgment
rule' yields to the rule of undivided loyalty." 3 9
The burden of proving lack of good faith, or independence, or
the existence of gross negligence, is substantial. 40 Several rationales are commonly advanced to justify the rule's apparent bias towards management. First, the observation that courts are not
competent to make, much less to second-guess, business decisions
is often cited as a justification.41 The business judgment rule has
been analogized to the standard of care for professionals such as
doctors, lawyers, and accountants. 42 Second, courts often observe
3
that directors need broad discretion to function effectively.4
Courts have stated that managerial risk-taking must be encouraged
and that honest mistakes must not be condemned. 44 Third, concern that qualified managers would not serve as officers and direc45
tors without judicial nonintervention arguably justifies the rule.

Finally, the rule allegedly discourages frivolous litigation and there46
fore promotes both judicial and business efficiency.
Underlying all of these plausible rationales, however, is a more
basic premise which is less frequently recognized. The business
judgment rule becomes relevant when a shareholder sues a manager.47 Courts have deferred to managerial decisions because of
the assumption that a shareholder has an alternate course of action:
selling the interest in the corporation. If the assumption of an
available alternative is accepted, the plaintiff's position arouses less
judicial sympathy. The courts presume that with a free and efficient
capital market, the economic remedy is more efficient than the legal
remedy. The market would not only redress an individual injury,
F. Supp. 1205 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788-89 n.17 (Del.
1981).
39 W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 1039.
40 See note 36 supra. "[The fact is that liability is rarely imposed upon corporate de-

fendants or officers simply for bad judgment and this reluctance to impose liability for unsuccessful business decisions has been doctrinally labelled the business judgment rule."
Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983). The
practical difficulty of showing "interest" on the part of the board of directors is underscored in cases such as Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984), which insist that the
plaintiff, at the complaint stage, provide detailed allegations of specific facts which show
"interest." Cf. Cohn, supra note 25, at 594.
41 See, e.g.,Joy v. North, 692 F.2d at 885-86; Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d 173,
180-81, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (1968); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 630, 393 N.E.2d
994, 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 (1979); Fischel, supra note'l 1, at 939.
42 Arsht, supra note 6, at 97; Lynch, supra note 21, at 452.
43 Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 274 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1129 (1979); cf. W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 1039.
44 Joy, 692 F.2d at 885-86. See also PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNANCE, supra note 3, introductory note at 2; Lynch, supra note 21, at 454.
45 Arsht, supra note 6, at 98-99; Lynch, supra note 21, at 453.
46 Arsht, supra note 6, at 95.
47 Of course, the lawsuit will ordinarily take the form of a derivative action.
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but also regulate management conduct more efficiently. 48 In short,
judicial deference to managerial decisions is based on an assumption of stock liquidity. Relaxed review would make sense only if the
49
court assumed that a shareholder has an economic remedy.
In summary, the business judgment rule in practice operates
both as a restraint on judicial behavior and a standard of managerial conduct. 50 The rule is properly invoked only when an independent and informed board of directors has made a decision in
good faith. 5 ' Once invoked, the rule imposes a substantial burden
of proof on the plaintiff.52 The traditional justifications for the rule
include: 1) the idea that judges are not business experts; 53 2) the
conviction that risk-taking must be encouraged; 5 4 3) the belief that
the rule provides necessary reassurance for capable managers; 55
and 4) the concern for the efficient operation of business and the
courts. 5 6 The rule is premised on the existence of an alternative
57
economic remedy for an aggrieved shareholder.
B.

Evidence of Stress

The rule's venerable position in corporate law has not prevented occasional expressions of doubt as to its continuing utility,58
such as Professor Cary's criticisms a decade ago. 59 In recent years,
60
however, the questioning has become more frequent.
1.

Publicly Held Corporations

62
Cases such as Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado6 1 and Joy v. North
provide evidence of dissatisfaction with the use of the rule in pub48

See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 11, at 39-44. See generally Fischel, supra note

I1.
49 Note, supra note 8, at 569. Closely related to this premise is an attitude akin to the
tort principle of assumption of risk: the belief that "[slince shareholders can and do select
among investments partly on the basis of management, the business judgment rule merely
recognizes a certain voluntariness in undertaking the risk of a bad business judgment." 692
F.2d at 885.
50

See note 20 supra.

51

See note 40 supra and accompanying text.

52
53

See note 40 supra.
See note 41 supra.

54

See notes 43-44 supra.

55
56

See note 45 supra.
See note 46 supra.

57 See notes 48-49 supra.
58 See Cary & Harris, supra note 34, at 66; S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 1533C (W. Jaeger ed. 1970); cf. Arsht, supra note 6, at 93 n.2.
59 Cary & Harris, supra note 34, at 66.
60 See, e.g., F. O'NEAL, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 9.04 (1975); Cohn,
supra note 25, at 594, 616-27; Lynch, supra note 21, at 452. But cf. Johnson & Osbourne,
The Role of the Business Judgment Rule in a Litigious Society, 15 VAL. U.L. REv. 49, 77 (1980).

61
62

430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
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licly held corporations. Both cases involved challenges to the use
of the business judgment rule to dismiss shareholder derivative litigation where demand on the board of directors was excused. Typically, when demand is excused, the board of directors appoints a
special committee, usually consisting of the disinterested directors.
The committee investigates the shareholder's complaint and makes
a recommendation to the full board. Ordinarily the decision
whether to prosecute a claim falls within the discretion of the board
of directors. Therefore, a recommendation to dismiss the derivative suit invokes the protection of the business judgment rule. Application of the rule requires the court to defer to the judgment of
the board, acting on the recommendation of its committee. The
63
technique, though controversial, has generally met with approval.
In Zapata, however, the Delaware Supreme Court declined to
endorse the unqualified use of the special litigation committee. Instead, the Zapata court held that two conditions must be satisfied
when a corporation, acting through a special litigation committee,
seeks to dismiss a shareholder's derivative suit where demand on
the board is excused. The corporation first must establish the independence and good faith of the committee, as well as a reasonable
investigation by the committee. 64 If this first condition is satisfied,
then the trial court applies its own independent business judgment
65
in deciding whether to dismiss the suit.
This second requirement indicates the Zapata court's uneasiness with the traditional operation of the business judgment rule.
The court remarked: "We are not satisfied that acceptance of the
'business judgment' rationale at this stage of derivative litigation is
a proper balancing point." 66 The court's uneasiness originated in
the belief that a board-appointed committee could not easily arrive
at a truly disinterested decision. 67 The court, in fact, analogized its
approach to that of shifting the burden of proof when interest is
shown and requiring the directors to establish the intrinsic fairness
68
of the challenged transaction.
63 There is general agreement that a decision by a board of directors not to prosecute a
derivative action will ordinarily be dispositive. See, e.g., United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263-64 (1917). See also note 7 supra. Disagreement arises
primarily in situations where prior demand on the board is sought to be excused as futile,
usually due to the alleged conflicting interests on the part of the board as managers and
defendants. Cases prior to Zapata had generally approved the use of the special litigation
committee technique in "demand excused" situations. See, e.g., Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F.
Supp. 508, 516-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 624, 635-36, 393
N.E.2d 994, 1001-02, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 922, 929 (1979).
64 430 A.2d at 788.
65 Id. at 789.
66 Id. at 787.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 788-89 n.17.
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In Joy v. North, the Second Circuit restated the Delaware
Supreme Court's misgivings about unrestricted application of the
business judgment rule. As in Zapata, the issue in Joy was the use of
the business judgment rule to dismiss derivative lawsuits. Like the
court in Zapata, the Second Circuit doubted the ability of a special
committee of the board of directors to operate completely independently, good intentions notwithstanding. Noting that "the business
judgment rule extends only as far as the reasons which justify its
existence," 69 theJoy court concluded that "the wide discretion afforded directors under the business judgment rule does not apply
when a special litigation committee recommends dismissal of a
suit."70

Thus, within eighteen months, two prestigious appellate courts
71
challenged the routine application of the business judgment rule.
Significantly, both cases involved the same type of corporation: a
large, publicly held corporation. Moreover, both courts conditioned invocation of the rule on the existence of independence and
good faith. The courts also expressed doubt that such conditions
typically exist in this context.
The impact of these two cases on the business judgment rule
should not, however, be overemphasized. Indeed, the business
judgment rule's impact has not been diminished. The Aronson
court's restatement of the functions and limitations of the rule
strongly indicates that the business judgment rule retains its position in corporate law. The American Law Institute's recent attempt
to codify the business judgment rule also supports the continued
72
vitality of the rule.
2.

Close Corporations

The dissatisfaction and doubt surrounding the application of
the business judgment rule is easier to trace with closely held cor69

692 F.2d at 886.

70

Id. at 889.

71 Judicial dissatisfaction with the business judgment rule predated Zapata andJoy, however, and has arisen in contexts other than the special litigation committee. For example,
there is Judge Cudahy's dissent in Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 279 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981). Frustrated by the majority's conclusion that use of the
business judgment rule was appropriate in situations where a corporate takeover is resisted
by a board apparently preoccupied with staying in office, Judge Cudahy complained: "I
emphatically disagree that the business judgment rule should clothe directors . . . with an
almost irrebuttable presumption of sound business judgment, prevailing over everything
but the elusive hobgoblins of fraud, bad faith or abuse of discretion." Id. at 279 (Cudahy,
J., dissenting). Dissatisfaction with unrestricted application of the business judgment rule
can also be detected in Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 275 (3d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979).
72

PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNANCE,

supra notes 3, 17. Some commentators believe the use

of the rule should be broadened. See, e.g., Johnson & Osbourne, supra note 60, at 77.
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porations than with publicly held corporations. Professor O'Neal,
for example, has consistently criticized the use of the business judgment rule in the closely held corporation. 3 A quarter century ago,
the Seventh Circuit expressed concern about the potential for unfairness to minority shareholders resulting from the use of the busi75
ness judgment rule.7 4 More recently, courts in Massachusetts,
76
77
78
New Jersey, New York,
and North Carolina have indicated
some discomfort with the use of the business judgment rule in the
close corporation context. The remainder of this article examines
the operation of the business judgment rule in that setting.
II.

The Business Judgment Rule and the Close Corporation
A.

The Special Nature of the Close Corporation

Like the business judgment rule itself, the term "close corporation" defies precise definition. Mr. Israels has described a close
corporation as a corporation "where management and ownership
are substantially identical to the extent that the independent judgment of the directors is, in fact, a fiction." 79 Though appealing for
its simplicity, that definition is overinclusive. Several courts and
legislatures insist that a close corporation has a limited number of
shareholders. 80 Also, the absence of a ready market for the corpo73 See generally F. O'NEAL, supra note 60.
74 Santarelli v. Katz, 270 F.2d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 1959).
75 See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 851, 353 N.E.2d 657,
663 (1976); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 593, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515-17
(1975).
76 See Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 NJ. Super. 141, 150-52, 400 A.2d
554, 559-60 (Law Div. 1979), aff'd, 173 NJ. Super. 559, 414 A.2d 994 (App. Div. 1980).
77 In re Topper, 107 Misc. 2d 25, 32-33, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 364-66 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
78 Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 301-06, 307 S.E.2d 551, 564-67 (1983).
79 Israels, The Sacred Cow of CorporateExistence: Problems of Deadlock and Dissolution, 19 U.
CHI. L. REv. 778, 778 (1952).
80 See, e.g., Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill. 2d 16, 27, 203 N.E.2d 577, 583-84 (1965); Donahue
v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 585, 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (1975); cf. W. CARY & M.
EISENBERG, supra note 1, at 366; H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 694-95; F.
O'NEAL, supra note 60, § 1.01 n.I.
Several legislatures have attempted to define the close corporation. Delaware, for example, defines a "close corporation" as follows:
(a) A close corporation is a corporation organized under this chapter whose certificate of incorporation contains the provisions required by § 102 of this title and, in
addition, provides that:
(1) All of the corporation's issued stock of all classes, exclusive of treasury
shares, shall be held of record by not more than a specified number of persons, not exceeding 30; and
(2) All of the issued stock of all classes shall be subject to 1 or more of the
restrictions on transfer permitted by § 202 of this title; and
(3) The corporation shall make no offering of any of its stock of any class
which would constitute a "public offering" within the meaning of the United
States Securities Act of 1933 [15 U.S.C. § 77 (1982)], as it may be amended
from time to time.
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ration's shares is often used as a characteristic. 8 '
These latter two attributes would certainly be expected to exist
in the type of corporation which Israels described.

However, a

more detailed and more lengthy definition, such as the one devised
by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, is preferable:

"We

deem a close corporation to be typified by: (1) a small number of
stockholders; (2) no ready market for the corporate stock; and

(3) substantial majority stockholder participation in the management, direction and operations of the corporation." 82
This tripartite description of the close corporation identifies
the differences between close and publicly held corporations. The
close identity between owners and managers in the close corpora-

tion contrasts sharply with the separation of ownership from control in the publicly held corporation. 83 The relatively small number

of shareholders in a close corporation is, of course, a logical prerequisite to any such identity between ownership and management.
The small pool of shareholders also prevents the development of
any ready market for the corporate stock. The lack of a meaningful
secondary market leads to the other critical distinction between the
close and the publicly held corporation: the free transferability of
interests assumed for the publicly held corporation 84 does not exist
for the close corporation.

Particularly since the late 1950's, the general proposition that
close corporations are in fact unique has been frequently acknowledged. At least four states have enacted special close corporation

codes over the past three decades. 8 5 A number of other states have
provided special recognition for close corporations in the general
corporation statute.8 6 The special nature of the close corporation
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 342 (1983).
Kansas and Pennsylvania have taken very similar approaches. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 177202 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1002(4), 1372 (Purdon Supp. 1984). Maryland essentially confers "close corporation" status on any corporation whose shareholders unanimously agree to such designation. MD. CORPS. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. §§ 4-101, 4-201
(1975). See generally O'Neal, Close Corporations: Existing Legislation and Recommended Reform, 33
Bus. LAw. 873 (1978).
81 See Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill. 2d 16, 27, 203 N.E.2d 577, 583 (1965). See also W. CARY &
M. EISENBERG, supra note 1, at 366; H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 695; F.
O'NEAL, supra note 60, § 1.01 n.1.
82 Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 586, 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (1975).
83 W. CARY & M. EIsENBERG, supra note 1, at 18-19; R. HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 18-19;
H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 128-29.
84 R. HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 19-20; H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 131.
85 These states are Delaware, Kansas, Maryland, and Pennsylvania. See note 80 supra.
86 There are a number of different legislative approaches currently in use which are
intended to address the special concerns of closely held corporations. They are summarized in W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 1, at 400-05. See also O'Neal, supra note 80, at
878-8 1; Note, Involuntary Dissolution of Close CorporationsForMistreatment of Minority Shareholders, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 1119, 1119 n.2 (1982).
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has likewise been recognized by the courts, but often in dicta and
rarely as an essential part of a rationale.8 7 For example, courts have
referred to a close corporation as an incorporated partnership,88 a
seemingly appropriate analogy in light of the previous description
89
of the close corporation.
Despite the sharp distinctions in function and appearance between publicly held and closely held corporations, most statutory
and common law applies equally to these two forms of business organization. 90 Most of the fundamental principles of corporate law
apply, or are made to apply, to all corporations. The organization
of law school casebooks illustrates the pattern: a collection of cases
and materials about corporations in general, and then, perhaps towards the end, a separate chapter on close corporations. 91
The business judgment rule is no exception. None of the
casebooks and few of the treatises even question whether the business judgment rule should apply to the close corporation. 92
Neither the commentary in the Model Business Corporation Act,
which prescribes the standard Of care for directors, nor the most
recent proposals of the American Law Institute relating to corporate governance, consider the special problem the business judgment rule might present in the close corporation.9 3 The lack of
attention to the issue is not surprising because the cases themselves
seldom suggest any problem with the use of the rule in close corporations. If raised, the question is usually addressed in a brief aside.
87 See, e.g., Galbreath v. Scott, 433 So. 2d 454, 457 (Ala. 1983); Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill.
2d 16, 26-31, 203 N.E.2d 577, 583-84 (1965); Exadaktilos v. Ginnaminson Realty Co., 167
NJ. Super. 141, 152, 400 A.2d 554, 560 (Law Div. 1979), aftd, 173 NJ. Super. 559, 414
A.2d 994 (App. Div. 1980); Gottfried v. Gottfried, 73 N.Y.S.2d 692, 695 (Sup. Ct. 1947);
Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 288-89, 307 S.E.2d 551, 557 (1983); Masinter v.
WEBCO Co., 262 S.E.2d 433, 435 (W. Va. 1980).
88 See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 586, 328 N.E.2d 505, 512
(1975); Kruger v. Gerth, 16 N.Y.2d 802, 805, 210 N.E.2d 355, 356, 263 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3
(1965) (Desmond, CJ., dissenting); In re Topper, 107 Misc. 2d 25, 31-32, 433 N.Y.S.2d
359, 364 (Sup. Ct. 1980); Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 289, 307 S.E.2d 551, 557
(1983).
89 See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 1, at 366. Indeed, the Donahue opinion
emphasizes the close parallels between the close corporation and the partnership. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 586-87, 328 N.E.2d 505, 512 (1975).
90 Special "codes" or "subchapters" for close corporations are not common among the
states. See notes 85-86 supra. Explicit recognition of close corporation status is also not
automatic in the reported decisions.
91 See, e.g., W. GARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 1 (one of 10 chapters is devoted to the
special problems of the close corporation); R. JENNINGS & R. BUXBAUM, CORPOATIONS
(1979) (one of 10 chapters); D. VAGTS, BASIC CORPORATION LAw (1979) (one 46 page chapter in an 822 page book expressly deals with the close corporation). But see R. HAMILTON,
supra note I (approximately one-half of the book is formally allocated to the close
corporation).
92 One of the few exceptions is found in F. O'NEAL, supra note 60, § 9.04, at 582.
93 PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNANCE, supra note 3.
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Rarely, if ever, does a result turn on whether the business judgment
94
rule should apply to close corporations.

B.

The Rule's Shortcomings

In both public and close corporations, the board of directors is

vested with basic management powers. 95 The board's management
decisions are implemented by officers appointed by the board and
by employees chosen by the officers. 96 Thus, all decisions about
dividend policy, employment and compensation, stock issuance and
purchase, and changes in corporate structure such as merger, consolidation or dissolution either originate with or can be ultimately
94 The question is indirectly raised in Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass.
578, 589-91, 328 N.E.2d 505, 513-14 (1975); in Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co.,
167 NJ. Super. 141, 154-55, 400 A.2d 554, 561 (Law Div. 1979), afd, 173 NJ. Super. 559,
414 A.2d 994 (App. Div. 1980); and in Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 291, 307
S.E.2d 551, 559 (1983). The question is alluded to in Santarelli v. Katz, 270 F.2d 762, 768
(7th Cir. 1959); and in In re Topper, 107 Misc. 2d 25, 28, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 362 (Sup. Ct.
1980). In Watts v. Des Moines Register & Tribune, 525 F. Supp. 1311, 1326 (S.D. Iowa
198 1), the plaintiff apparently raised unsuccessfully the question of the business judgment
rule's applicability in closely held corporations.
95 The basis for the vesting of such power is always statutory. For example, the first
sentence of § 35 of the Model Business Corporation Act provides:
All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under authority of, and the business
and affairs of a corporation shall be managed under the direction of, a board of
directors except as may be otherwise provided in this Act or the articles of
incorporation.
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 35 (1979). The corresponding Delaware provision is found
in § 141(a):
The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter
shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may
be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1983). See also CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 300(a) (West 1977
and Supp. 1985); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 701 (McKinney Supp. 1984-85). See generally H.
HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 562-64.
Many state codes now recognize and validate the more informal management system
typical of many close corporations. One such technique is to include a clause such as "except as may be otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation," as in § 35 of the Model
Act and § 141(a) of the Delaware Code. Another technique is illustrated by § 300(b) of the
California Corp. Code:
Notwithstanding subdivision (a) or any other provision of this division, but subject
to subdivision (c), no shareholders' agreement, which relates to any phase of the
affairs of a close corporation, including but not limited to management of its business, division of its profits or distribution of its assets on liquidation, shall be invalid as between the parties thereto on the ground that it so relates to the conduct of
the affairs of the corporation as to interfere with the discretion of the board or that
it is an attempt to treat the corporation as if it were a partnership or to arrange
their relationships in a manner that would be appropriaie only between partners.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 300(b) (West 1977 and Supp. 1985). See generally H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 717.
96 See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 50 (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(a) (1983);
W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 1, at 178; H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at
564, 586.
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attributed to the corporation's officers and directors. 97 The business judgment rule ordinarily applies to these types of decisions. 98
Scrutinizing the impact of these types of decisions suggests the
shortcomings of the business judgment rule in the context of a
close corporation.
1. Dividends and Compensation
Normally, shareholders receive a return on their investment
through the payment of dividends. 99 The declaration of dividends
is always at the discretion of the board of directors. 00 The business judgment rule protects such a decision. '1 1 The rule has been
consistently applied in dividend cases involving either a publicly
held or a close corporation. 0 2 In fact, several classic statements of
the business judgment rule have resulted from challenges to dividend policy in close corporations. For example, in Gottfried v. Gottfried, the New York Superior Court expressed this view:
[T]he mere existence of an adequate corporate surplus is not
sufficient to invoke court action to compel . . . a dividend.

There must also be bad faith on the part of the directors ...
The court is not concerned with the direction which the exercise
of the judgment of the Board of Directors may take, provided
only that such exercise ofjudgment be made in good faith. It is
axiomatic that the court will not substitute its judgment for that
of the Board of Directors.103

But most closely held corporations rarely pay dividends. 0 4 Instead, compensation for services is the principal return on the
shareholders' investment in a close corporation. 0 5 Corporate law
97 See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 1, at 141-49.
98 See notes 27-33 supra and accompanying text. It is generally assumed that the protection afforded by the business judgment rule extends to officers as well as directors. W.
FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 1039 (cases cited therein); H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, supra note 1,
at 663.
99 See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 1, at 1335; H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, supra
note 1, at 869-70.
100 Cf. 2 W. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 526; H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at
913, 913 n.3.
101 Id. See also notes 108-68 infra and accompanying text.
102 See, e.g., H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 694; Manne, supra note 10, at 28081; Note, Freezing Out Minority Shareholders, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1630, 1639 (1961); Note, supra
note 86, at 1119. See generally Gottfried v. Gottfried, 73 N.Y.S.2d 692 (Sup. Ct. 1947);
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919).
103 73 N.Y.S.2d at 695.
104 See F. O'NEAL, supra note 60, § 3.06; Note, Executive Compensation in Close Corporations:
The Needfor a ModifiedJudidalApproach to the Reasonableness Test, DUKE L.J. 1251, 1257 (1972).
But see Z. CAvrrcH, TAX PLANNING FOR CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS § 6.01, 6-3
(1980).
105 See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 850, 353 N.E.2d 657,
662 (1976); Hallahan v. Haltom Corp., 7 Mass. App. 68, 70, 385 N.E.2d 1033, 1034 (1979);
Gottfried v. Gottfried, 73 N.Y.S.2d 692, 696 (Sup. Ct. 1947). See also 1 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE
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considerations generally do not determine the distribution of dividends and compensation. Federal tax laws usually shape dividend
policy in the closely held corporation. The payment of compensation reduces the corporation's taxable income, but the payment of
dividends does not. Tax strategists therefore advocate maximizing
salaries and minimizing the payment of dividends.' 0 6 Thus, unlike
the situation in the publicly held corporation, compensation and
dividend policies in the closely held corporation are related. This
correlation, however, has not affected judicial use of the business
judgment rule. Instead, courts ordinarily have analyzed compensation and dividend questions separately. 10 7 That approach has produced confused and often unfair results.
Gottfried v. Gottfried'08 exemplifies this traditional approach. In
Gottfried, the minority shareholders sued to compel a profitable,
family-owned bakery to declare a dividend. 10 9 The case contained
the classic characteristics of a minority shareholder derivative suit
in a close corporation: stock ownership unevenly weighted to favor
one side of the family, 1 0 substantial intra-family discord,"' and an
12
employment pattern mirroring the stock ownership."
The plaintiffs contended that the presence of the majority
shareholders on the corporate payroll ensured that dividends
would rarely be paid. 13 Although conceding that the defendants'
compensation was "substantial" 1 4 and acknowledging the existence of "bitter dissension and personal hostility," 115 the court nevertheless refused to compel a dividend. The requisite level of bad
faith by the directors had not been demonstrated."16 The court's
adoption of a bad faith requirement suggests that the court applied
the business judgment rule1 7 and ignored the identity between the
board of directors and the majority shareholders.
The court thus separated the compensation issue from the divi1.07 (2d ed. 1971); F. O'NEAL, supra note 60, § 3.06; Note, supra note 104,
at 1257.
106 See Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 277 (Alaska 1980); Z. CAVITCH,
supra note 104, § 1.01 [3][a] 1-13; R. HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 12-13; Note, supra note
104, at 1257.
CORPORATIONS §

107

See notes 108-18, 133-45, and 148-53 infra and accompanying text.

108 73 N.Y.S.2d 692 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
109

Id. at 693-94.

110 Id. at 694.
111 Id. at 696.
112

Id.

113 Id. at 695.
114 Id. at 696.
115

Id.

116 Id. at 695, 701. The result is all the more remarkable in light of the court's acknowledgement that "closely held corporations are easily subject to abuse on the part of dominant shareholders." Id. at 695.
117 Id. at 695.
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dend question. But the separation is artificial: dividends and compensation merely represent two different methods to transfer the
close corporation's earnings to its owners. If only certain shareholders received dividends, the business judgment rule would not
bar a court from granting relief to the excluded shareholders.' 18
Courts therefore should scrutinize the compensation levels in a
close corporation in light of the relationship between compensation
and dividend payments.
The older case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. 119 both foreshadowed
the Gottfried result and suggested a different analysis. In Dodge, the
plaintiffs sued to halt expansion of the business and, as in Gottfried,
to compel the payment of dividends.' 20 The court discussed at
length the traditional judicial reluctance to interfere with a matter
ordinarily left to the directors' discretion. However, the court ultimately found for the plaintiffs on the dividend issue.' 2 ' The plaintiffs, nevertheless, did not prevail on the question of expansion.
The court instead deferred to the management's business judgment
and abstained from reviewing the merits of the expansion
decision.122

Both dividend policy and business expansion decisions represent classic situations to apply the business judgment rule. Yet in
Dodge, management prevailed on only one of these two issues. The
key to understanding this apparent inconsistency lies in the court's
criticism of Henry Ford's expressed intention to forego dividends
indefinitely. Ford's dividend decision indicated that the business
would no longer be operated for the shareholders' economic benefit as a private, for-profit corporation should be operated. The
court felt judicial intervention to be appropriate in such a situation:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for
the profit of the shareholders. The powers of the directors are
to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be
exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not
extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits,
or to the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order
to devote them to other purposes.

. .

it is not within the lawful

powers of a board of directors to shape and conduct the affairs
of a corporation for the merely incidental benefit of
118 Such conduct would presumably lack the "rational basis" required for the invocation
of the business judgment rule. It would also strongly indicate lack of good faith. Cf. Alaska
Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 277 (Alaska 1980); Gray v. Hall, 10 Ill. App. 3d
1030, 295 N.E.2d 506 (1973).
119 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919).
120 Id. at 474, 170 N.W. at 673. Ford Motor Co. at the time was a closely held corporation. Henry Ford alone owned 58% of the stock. Id. at 467, 170 N.W. at 671.
121 Id. at 499-508, 170 N.W. at 681'-84.
122 Id. at 507-08, 170 N.W. at 684.
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shareholders .... 123

The directors' sin in Dodge was in a sense misfeasance. The directors failed to operate the business for the economic benefit of the
owners.
The significance of Dodge is its tacit recognition of a restriction
on the use of the business judgment rule. When management
ceases to operate a for-profit corporation for profit, the protection
of the business judgment rule should not be available. That restriction, seldom recognized in subsequent cases, suggests a major flaw
in the application of the business judgment rule to the close corporation. The close corporation is an enterprise cast in the form of a
corporation, but decisions in the close corporation are often based
on non-corporate considerations.1 24 As in Dodge, personal goals are
easily transformed into corporate "policy."' 2 5 The apparent ease
of the transformation can be an overwhelming temptation.
The recent case of In re Reading Co. 126 illustrates the problem of
eliminating personal considerations from corporate decision-making. The trustee in bankruptcy of Reading Company sued to com27
pel a buy-out of Trailer Train Company stock held by Reading.
Trailer Train was a corporation originally organized by a number of
railroads, including Reading, to provide a pool of standardized railroad flat cars at the lowest possible cost.' 28 In effect, Trailer Train
was a closely held corporation whose majority shareholders, the
railroads, controlled the corporation's operations. 29
Reading entered bankruptcy reorganization proceedings and
subsequently abandoned all rail operations. 3 0 When Reading's
123

Id. at 507, 170 N.W. at 684.
124 Tax considerations typically dictate the operation of the close corporation. For example, there is usually strong impetus to distribute corporate earnings as compensation
and to virtually eliminate dividends because the corporation cannot deduct dividends paid
to shareholders. Such a strategy can obviously work to the detriment of non-employee
shareholders. The cases are replete with examples. See, e.g., Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270 (Alaska 1980); Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842,
353 N.E.2d 657 (1976); Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983). See
also notes 104-07 supra.
125 Personal relationships are of great importance in most close corporations, as the
analogy to a partnership suggests. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 586,
328 N.W.2d 505, 512 (1975). See 2 F. O'NEAL, supra note 105, § 9.02; Hetherington &
Dooley, supra note 11, at 2. As a result, there is an inherent tendency for personal goals to
obscure corporate goals. When the trust and confidence among the principals deteriorates,
objective corporate decision-making becomes difficult.
126 711 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'k 551 F. Supp. 1205 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
127 Id. at 512. In the alternative, the trustee requested an order compelling Trailer
Train to convert the stock held by Reading to debt or preferred stock or to pay dividends.
128 Id. at 512-13.
129 Id. at 513. Trailer Train's stock was held by 33 shareholders, 30 of whom were operating railroads.
130 Id. at 512.
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need for Trailer Train's services disappeared, the trustee in bankruptcy attempted to force Trailer Train to buy back its stock held by
Reading.' 3 ' The Third Circuit denied the trustee any relief. The
court relied heavily on the business judgment rule to justify Trailer
Train's policies of lowest possible car leasing rates, no declaration
of dividends, and consistent reinvestment of earnings in new equipment. 3 2 But, as the captive subsidiary of the railroads, the Trailer
Train Company was managed more like a cooperative than a corporation. In such circumstances, the Trailer Train board could hardly
have exercised any business judgment at all.
As Reading indicates, the limitations suggested in Dodge have
not been widely accepted. Instead, the Gottfried court's conclusion
that a shareholder must show bad faith on the part of the board to
compel dividends and the court's failure to link compensation practice with dividend policy have established the pattern for most of
the subsequent litigation in this area. 133 Dodge, when used at all, is
cited for the view that dividend policy is essentially a management
decision.'34

For example, in Gay v. Gay's Supermarkets,'35 the corporation
fired the minority shareholder. 36 When the board decided shortly
thereafter not to declare dividends for the preceding year, the minority shareholder sued to compel dividends.' 37 Relying on Gottfried, the court dismissed the suit, holding that the plaintiff must
show fraud, bad faith or abuse of discretion by the board in order
to prevail. The court noted that judicial intervention is appropriate
only in "extreme cases."' 1 8 The case presents a textbook application of the business judgment rule. If a plausible business purpose
for the failure to pay dividends can be shown, judicial deference
follows. The case's significance lies in the narrowness of the court's
review. The court ignored the closely held status of the corpora131 Id.
132 Id. at 520. Before invoking the business judgment rule, the court first disposed of
the trustee's main argument that the business judgment rule was inapplicable because of
self-dealing. Application of the business judgment rule produced an interesting and somewhat circular analysis. The court justified the low rate, no dividend, reinvestment policy by
pointing out that: (1) keeping rates as low as possible keeps demand for the cars high; and
(2) not paying dividends keeps rates low because the need for a surplus is eliminated. The
company's policy, the court suggested, must have been on target because "under the challenged policies Trailer Train has undergone remarkable growth." Id. at 520.
133 See notes 135-45 and 148-53 infra and accompanying text.
134 See, e.g., Miller v. Magline Inc., 76 Mich. App. 284, 285, 256 N.W.2d 761, 769 (1977);
Zidell v. Zidell Inc., 277 Or. 413, 419, 560 P.2d 1086, 1089 (1977). Oddly enough, the
language most often cited from Dodge are passages which the Dodge court quoted at length
from earlier sources.
135 343 A.2d 577 (Me. 1975).
136 Id. at 578.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 580, 582.
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tion 13 9 and the possibility of a link between compensation and
dividends.
Two years later, in Zidell v. Zidell, Inc.,140 the Oregon Supreme
Court took the same approach. Again, a close corporation was the
setting for a dispute between minority and majority shareholders
over the payment of dividends. The plaintiff, a former employee,
sued to compel dividends. 1 4 ' The trial court granted relief; on appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court reversed. In the face of undisputed hostility between the minority and the majority
shareholders, 4 2 and concededly generous salaries and bonuses for
shareholder-employees,1 4 3 the court nonetheless insisted that the
44
plaintiff had failed to show bad faith on the part of the board.'
That failure was fatal. Absent such a showing, on the strength of
Gottfried and Gay, the court reinstated the board's decision. As in
Gottfried and Gay, the court never considered the special nature of
the close corporation. Moreover, the court ignored the subsequent
increase in compensation for shareholder-employees after the
45
plaintiff's departure.'
Zidell, however, expanded the scope of the business judgment
rule. In one paragraph, the Zidell court not only conceded the existence of a fiduciary duty owed by those in control to minority shareholders but also restated the business judgment rule.' 4 6 This
juxtaposition suggests that the controlling shareholders have satisfied the duty to the minority 4 7 if a corporate decision is made in
apparent good faith and for a legitimate business purpose. The inference, of course, is that the business judgment rule is a complete
defense to a claim of breach of a fiduciary duty. This would include
not only the duty of care and loyalty but also the duty owed by
those in control to the minority. This new development in effect
139 Fifty-one percent of the common stock was held by Hannaford Bros. Co. The remaining stock was owned in equal portions by the plaintiff and his brother.
140 277 Or. 413, 560 P.2d 1086 (1977).
141 Id. at 417, 560 P.2d at 1087, 1088.
142 Id. at 416-17, 560 P.2d at 1088.
143 Id. at 417-19, 560 P.2d at 1088, 1089.
144 Id. at 421, 560 P.2d at 1090.
145 Id. at 417, 560 P.2d at 1088. The dispute apparently surfaced when the plaintiff
demanded a raise. When his request was denied, he resigned his position. Shortly thereafter the board substantially increased its employees' compensation.
146 Id. at 418, 560 P.2d at 1089.
147 A variety of courts in a number of states have concluded that controlling shareholders owe a fiduciary duty to minority shareholders. See, e.g., Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1
Cal. 3d 93, 108-12, 460 P.2d 464, 471-74, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 599-602 (1969); Donahue v.
Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 592-93, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (1975); Gaines v. Long
Mfg. Co., 234 N.C. 340, 345, 67 S.E.2d 350, 353-54 (1951); Baker v. Commercial Body
Builders, Inc., 264 Or. 614, 629, 507 P.2d 387, 394 (1973), and the cases collected in
Masinter v. WEBCO Co., 262 S.E.2d 433, 438 n.5 (W. Va. 1980). See generally notes 306-08
infra and accompanying text.
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would eliminate the judicially-imposed duty of the majority to the
minority.
The single-minded insistence in Gottfried, Gay, and Zidell that
the business judgment rule requires deference to the board's dividend policy, regardless of the circumstances, has surfaced in even
more egregious situations. For example, in Romanik v. Lurie Home
Supply Center, Inc.,148 the court invoked the business judgment rule
to sustain the board's no-dividend policy against a backdrop of
widespread self-dealing by the majority shareholder. The self-dealing included the execution of a one-sided lease, 149 the payment of
generous compensation to the majority shareholder, 150 the extension of unsecured loans to the majority shareholder's estate, 151 and
the subsequent payment of a death benefit to the majority shareholder's widow. 152 The case's result and the presence of the business judgment rule in the rationale are surprising because the
minority shareholders actually prevailed on several other issues.' 5 3
Courts, of course, have also shown another approach to deference under the rule. The homage paid to the business judgment
rule is frequently followed by a recital that equity will intervene in
cases of true oppression. 54 Occasionally, a decision acknowledges
the connection between compensation practice and dividend policy. Even in such cases, however, the business judgment rule often
inhibits proper analysis.
148 105 Ill. App. 3d 1118, 435 N.E.2d 712 (1982).
149 Id. at 1123, 1129-30, 435 N.E.2d at 715, 719-20. The lease was for five years and
provided for an annual rental of $36,000 on property appraised at $41,000.
150 Id. at 1123, 1125-27, 435 N.E.2d at 715, 717-18. In 1974, when the majority shareholder, Mr. Lurie, was 69, the corporation agreed to a five year employment contract, with
an option for renewal. Mr. Lurie's base compensation was set at $54,600, representing a
$15,000 raise. The agreement also provided for deferred compensation of 60% of base
salary for ten years, in the event of retirement, disability, or death.
151 Id. at 1124, 1132-33, 435 N.E.2d at 716, 722. Unsecured loans totaling almost
$17,000 were extended at below-market rates at a time when a first loan of $53,988 was in
default.
152 Id. at 1123, 1127-28, 435 N.E.2d at 715, 718-19. The board, consisting of the
widow's two sons, authorized a payment of $5000. The payment was not required under

the decedent-majority shareholder's employment contract.
153 No dividends were, in fact, ever paid during the life of the corporation. Id. at 1134,
435 N.E.2d at 723. Overall, the corporation was run as if it were owned solely by the
majority shareholder. Relief was granted regarding the lease, the excessive term of the
deferred compensation agreement (reduced to five years), and the below-market interest
rates on the notes. The striking aspect of the case is how the business judgment rule could
plausibly be invoked on the dividend issue against this backdrop of events, all of which
suggest lack of independence and good faith. The court simply posited that "[c]ourts are
reluctant to interfere with the exercise of the directors' business judgment unless the withholding is fraudulent, oppressive, or totally without merit." Id. (emphasis added) (citation
omitted).
154 See, e.g., Santarelli v. Katz, 270 F.2d 762, 768 (7th Cir. 1959); Gottfried v. Gottfried,
73 N.Y.S.2d 692, 696 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
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Thus, in Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, a5 5 the Alaska Supreme
Court noted that compensation, fringe benefits, and perquisites not
related to the reasonable value of the recipient's services constitute
constructive dividends. Such dividends should be shared among all
the shareholders. 15 6 The court declined, however, to venture further and shortly thereafter restated and endorsed the business
57
judgment rule. 1
Once again, the tenacity of the doctrine is striking. Given the
link between compensation and dividends, 5 8 the business judgment rule should not have entered the picture. An obvious potential for self-dealing exists when the same group establishes its own
salaries and decides on dividend payments for non-shareholder employees. This potential should prevent the use of the business judg59
ment rule.1
Miller v. Magline, Inc. 160 illustrates the confusion caused by applying the rule in this area. In Miller, two minority shareholders
sued to compel dividends and to recover allegedly excessive compensation paid to employee-shareholders. 6 1 The plaintiffs once
had been employees themselves, but they no longer worked for the
business. 16 2 As a result, the plaintiffs were dissatisfied with the nodividend policy which had served everyone's interest in past
years. 16 3 On both issues-dividends and compensation-the appellate court concluded that the burden of proof was properly placed
16 4
on the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs convinced the court to consider more than just
dividend policy because a close corporation was involved. 16 5 That
success led to a partial victory: the court affirmed the chancellor's
finding that dividends should be declared and paid. 16 6 The plaintiffs attack on the level of compensation of the shareholder-employees, however, was unsuccessful. 16 7 On the compensation issue,
the court emphasized the technical abstention of each director-em155 621 P.2d 270 (Alaska 1980).
156 Id. at 277.
157 Id. at 278.
158 See notes 104-06, 117-18 supra and accompanying text.
159 Use of the business judgment rule assumes an independent board of directors, unfettered by a conflict of interest. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
160 76 Mich. App. 284, 256 N.W.2d 761 (1977).
161 Id. at 288, 289, 256 N.W.2d at 762, 763. The two plaintiffs owned 41% of the stock.
The remaining 59% was held by the six individual defendants.
162 Id. at 290, 256 N.W.2d at 763.
163 Id. at 291, 256 N.W.2d at 763.
164 Id. at 295, 256 N.W.2d at 765-66.
165 Id. at 304-08, 256 N.W.2d at 765-66.
166 Id. at 300-02, 256 N.W.2d at 770-71.
167 Id. at 295, 256 N.W.2d at 768.
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ployee on his own salary.1 68
On the dividend policy question, the court cited Dodge v. Ford
Motor Co. for the proposition that in the absence of bad faith, wilful
neglect, or abuse of discretion, the board decision will be respected.1 6 9 The court struggled for a rationale and apparently
70
chose breach of the directors' fiduciary duty to the shareholders.
The opinion reflects the difficulty the court encountered in articulating how the directors breached that duty. The court simultaneously approved the director-determined levels of shareholderemployee compensation and criticized the paucity of dividend
payments.
Both determinations are classic management decisions protected by the business judgment rule. Both determinations also
transfer profits from the close corporation into the hands of at least
some of the owners. The source of either dividend or compensation payments is the same. The constructive dividend approach
17 1
mentioned in Alaska Plastics, however, remained untried in Miller.
The confusion in such cases as Miller and Zidell is unnecessary.
The courts' acknowledgement of the relevance of the business
judgment rule to the close corporation caused that confusion. The
rationale in any opinion is equally as important as the correctness
of the result. Travelling through the terrain of the close corporation, however, presents many obstacles when the compass is the
business judgment rule.
2.

Employment Matters

a. Compensation
The hiring, firing, and compensation of employees are ultimately board decisions and have always qualified as management
decisions protected by the business judgment rule.' 72 The connection between compensation and dividend policy has been previously discussed. 173 Compensation practice alone, however, raises
questions about the appropriateness of the business judgment rule
in the close corporation. Customarily the directors who make com74
pensation decisions are also employees in a close corporation.
168 Id. at 296, 256 N.W.2d at 766.
169 Id. at 303, 256 N.W.2d at 769.
170 Id. at 304-05, 256 N.W.2d at 769-70.
171 The case for a "constructive dividend" theory was particularly appealing. The compensation levels of the shareholder-employees were pegged directly to corporate earnings
through low base salaries and percentage incentive bonuses. Id. at 290-91, 256 N.W.2d at
763-64.
172 See H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 661-63; Note, supra note 104, at 1260.
173 See notes 104-07, 117-18 supra and accompanying text.
174 See F. O'NFAL, supra note 60, § 9.04; Note, supra note 104, at 1256, 1264. Such was
the case, for example, in Gotifried, Dodge, Romanik, Miller, Alaska Plastics, and Zidell.
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In short, compensation decisions are made by the same people who
will receive the compensation. As a result, at least the possibility of
175
self-dealing is always present.
Self-dealing, of course, traditionally triggers an "intrinsic fairness" inquiry, usually a more exacting standard of review than the
business judgment rule. 176 In practice, the intrinsic fairness standard shifts the burden of proof from the plaintiffs to the defendants. 7 7 Such a shift, however, does not always make the business
judgment rule inapplicable. For example, the court in Romanik v.
Lurie Home Supply Center, Inc.,178 after finding that self-dealing existed when the majority shareholder's compensation was determined, concluded 179that the defendant had the burden to prove
"reasonableness."
The court then reluctantly noted the applicability of the business judgment rule and upheld the majority shareholder's compensation. 18 0
The rule can also surface in seemingly impartial situations, as
when a director-employee formally abstains from the vote on his or
her own salary.' 8 1 This technique makes the board's decision seem
objective and makes the relaxed review of the business judgment
rule seem appropriate.1 8 2 Nevertheless, judicial review of compensation in the close corporation does not significantly differ from
such review in the publicly held corporation. Although the ordi83
nary standard of review for both is the business judgment rule,1
that standard is not always appropriate in the closely held
175 See F. O'NEAL, supra note 60, § 9.04; Note, supra note 104, at 1255-56, 1264.
176 See Lewis v. S. L. & E., Inc., 629 F.2d 764, 768 (2d Cir. 1980); Santarelli v. Katz, 270
F.2d 762, 769 (7th Cir. 1959); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788 n.17 (Del.
1981). See also Arsht, supra note 6, at 115-16; notes 37-39 supra and accompanying text. But
see Recent Cases-Close Corporations-Stockholders'Duty of "Utmost Good Faith and Loyalty" Requires Controlling Shareholder Selling a Close CorporationIts Own Shares to Cause the Corporationto
Offer to Purchasea Ratable Number of Sharesfrom Minority, 89 HARV. L. REv. 423, 425-26 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Stockholders' Duty].
177 Lewis v. S. L. & E., Inc., 629 F.2d 764, 768 (2d Cir. 1980). See Arsht, supra note 6, at
116; notes 37-39 supra and accompanying text.
178 105 Ill.
App. 3d 1118, 435 N.E.2d 712 (1982).
179 Id. at 1126, 435 N.E.2d at 717.
180 Id. at 1127, 435 N.E.2d at 718.
181 See, e.g., Miller v. Magline, Inc., 76 Mich. App. 284, 294-96, 256 N.W.2d 761, 765-66
(1977).
182 Id.
183 Note, supra note 104, at 1264. DiIaconi v. New Cal Corp., 97 N.M. 782, 643 P.2d
1234 (1980), illustrates a particularly egregious situation. The New Cal board of directors
approved payment of a $40,000 "management fee" to one of the three individual defendants in connection with the development of unimproved real property. The three defendants owned well over half of the corporation's stock. The board consisted of the three
individual defendants, who also served as the officers of the corporation. Relying on the
business judgment rule, the appellate court upheld the corporate payments to the defendant, without discussion of any apparent conflict of interest or self-dealing.
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corporation. 184
b.

Termination of Employment

Litigation to compel dividends often arises from a decision,
either by the shareholder or the corporation, to terminate a shareholder's employment.1 8 5 Separating employment from ownership
destroys the shareholders' common interest in maximizing compensation and in minimizing dividend payments. 18 6
Considered alone, an employment decision appears to warrant
the deference suggested by the business judgment rule.18 7 Because
of its connection to dividend policy, however, such a decision in a
close corporation should rarely be reviewed in isolation.' 8 8 Nonetheless, courts often decide personnel issues in isolation. 8 9 The
approach resembles the strategy of dividing and conquering.
Viewed separately, challenges to dividend policy, compensation
practice, or personnel decisions rarely survive the invocation of the
business judgment rule. Such fragmentation is inappropriate in the
close corporation, however, because of the close connection between these three issues.
3.

Other Contexts

Dividend policy, compensation practice, and employment matters most frequently provide the setting for the use of the business
judgment rule in the close corporation. However, any management
decision triggers the rule. 90 Thus, decisions to issue additional
stock, 19 ' to repurchase outstanding stock, 192 to merge with another
corporation, 93 or to seek dismissal of a derivative suit 94 have
184 See notes 219-54 infra and accompanying text.
185 See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657
(1976); Gay v. Gay's Supermarkets, 343 A.2d 577 (Me. 1975) (plaintiff fired). Cf Miller v.
Magline, Inc., 76 Mich. App. 284, 256 N.W.2d 761 (1977); Zidell v. Zidell, Inc., 277 Or.
413, 560 P.2d 1086 (1977) (plaintiffs resigned more or less voluntarily).
186 Note, supra note 104, at 1256. See notes 104-07 supra and accompanying text.
187 Personnel decisions are a basic part of management authority and ordinarily qualify
as "business judgments" protected by the business judgment rule. Wilkes v. Springside
Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 851, 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (1976). See H. HENN &J.
ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 661-63. See also notes 20-32 supra and accompanying text.
188 See note 186 supra.
189 See, e.g., Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, 264 Or. 614, 507 P.2d 387 (1973);
Campbell v. Ford Indus., Inc., 266 Or. 479, 513 P.2d 1153 (1973). See also F. O'NEAL, supra
note 60, § 3.06. But see Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 852-53,
353 N.E.2d 657, 663-64 (1976); Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 288, 307 S.E.2d
551, 557 (1983).
190 See notes 20-32 supra and accompanying text.
191 See, e.g., Ski Roundtop, Inc. v. Hall, 658 P.2d 1071 (Mont. 1983).
192 See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975).
193 See, e.g., Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 341 F. Supp. 240 (D. Neb. 1972), aft'd, 473
F.2d 537 (8th Cir. 1973).
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caused litigation involving the business judgment rule in the close
corporation. Furthermore, allegations of misfeasance in the ordinary conduct of business 195 have prompted a similar inquiry.
A pattern in these cases is not immediately discernible. Most
courts simply assume the business judgment rule should apply,
without considering the special nature of the enterprise involved.' 9 6
In the only case where the plaintiff posed the issue directly, the
court brushed the argument aside.19 7 Occasionally, a court will
note the closely held nature of the corporation and will criticize in
dicta the operation of the business judgment rule.1 98 But the close
status of the subject corporation has affected the holding in only a
few cases. 19 9 Typically, the courts unquestioningly apply the business judgment rule, occasionally tempering the opinion with the
qualification that evidence of self-dealing will cause stricter scrutiny
and will shift the burden of proof to the defendants.2 0 0 In any
event, no court has explicitly rejected the rule's validity in the
20
closely held corporation. '
4.

A Restatement

The problem in this area is not the results in any of the previously described cases, but rather the process used to reach these
results. Review of the cases indicates that the process itself needs
refinement. The opinions are characterized by the confusing and
194

See, e.g., Watts v. Des Moines Register & Tribune, 525 F. Supp. 1311 (S.D. Iowa

1981).
195 See, e.g., Lewis v. S. L. & E., Inc., 629 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1980); Lussier v. Mau-Van
Dev., Inc., 667 P.2d 804 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1983); Dilaconi v. New Cal Corp., 97 N.M. 782,
643 P.2d 1234 (1980).

196 See, e.g., In re Reading Co., 711 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1983), rev' 551 F. Supp. 1205 (E.D.
Pa. 1982); Lewis v. S. L. & E., Inc., 629 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1980); Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid
Co., 341 F. Supp. 240 (D. Neb. 1972), aff'd, 473 F.2d 537 (8th Cir. 1973); Lussier v. MauVan Dev., Inc., 667 P.2d 804 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1983); Ski Roundtop, Inc. v. Hall, 658 P.2d
1071 (Mont. 1983); Dilaconi v. New Cal Corp., 97 N.M. 782, 643 P.2d 1234 (1980).
197 In Watts v. Des Moines Register & Tribune, 525 F. Supp. 1311 (S.D. Iowa 1981), the
district court stated: "Plaintiffs argue that the business judgment rule is inapposite in cases
such as the one at bar where director fraud is alleged and where the nominal corporate
defendant is closely held . . . . [Tihe Court is satisfied that the welfare of minority shareholders is adequately protected under the Zapata test." Id. at 1326.
198 See, e.g., Santarelli v. Katz, 270 F.2d 762, 768 (7th Cir. 1959); Romanik v. Lurie
Home Supply Center, Inc., 105 Ill. App. 3d 1118, 1127, 435 N.E.2d 712, 718 (1982) (criticizing "exaggerated judicial deference to the business judgment of directors"); Exadaktilos
v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 NJ. Super. 141, 154, 400 A.2d 554, 561 (Law Div. 1979),
aft'd, 173 NJ. Super. 559, 414 A.2d 994 (App. Div. 1980).
199 See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657
(1976); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975).
200 See, e.g., the cases collected at notes 195-96 supra.
201 Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975), and Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983), probably come the closest to
outright rejection of the rule. In In re Topper, 107 Misc. 2d 25, 28, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 362
(Sup. Ct. 1980), the court simply describes the business judgment rule as "irrelevant."
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frequently inconsistent use of various corporate law doctrines. A
202
rationale rarely can be identified.
The business judgment rule adds to the confusion because its
use encourages piecemeal review of management decisions which
are actually related parts of a pattern. 203 Decisions, innocuous
when viewed alone, may suggest a serious problem if examined in
context.20 4 The events generally known as a "freeze-out" illustrate
this point.
Like most terms in this area, a freeze-out 20 5 is easier to describe than to define. Invariably, the purpose of a freeze-out is to
eliminate or to suppress one or more minority interests through
facially neutral means.20 6 Those means include the elimination of
dividends or the conversion of dividends into an expense deductible for the corporation and payable to less than all the shareholders, such as inflated rents or salaries. Other methods employed are
the termination of employment, the sale of corporate assets-often
to the majority interest at a favorable price-the issuance of new
stock, a merger or consolidation, or the alteration of the voting
rights.20 7 An effective freeze-out is often a combination of these
techniques.208 Strikingly, each of these freeze-out techniques represents the sort of decision covered by the business judgment rule.
Thus, the rule offers a comprehensive defense for objectionable
conduct. 20 9 In fact, at least one court has suggested that if the offensive conduct falls under the business judgment rule, no claim of
2
oppression will lie.

10

The business judgment rule forces litigation of oppressive con202 Cases such as Lussier v. Mau-Van Dev., Inc., 667 P.2d 804 (Hawaii App. Ct. 1983);
Romanik v. Lurie Home Supply Center, Inc., 105 Ill. App. 3d 1118,435 N.E.2d 712 (1982);
Miller v. Magline, Inc., 76 Mich. App. 284, 256 N.W.2d 761 (1977); Dilaconi v. New Cal
Corp., 97 N.M. 782, 643 P.2d 1234 (1980); and Zidell v. Zidell, Inc., 277 Or. 413, 560 P.2d
1086 (1977), are particularly illustrative.
203 See notes 117, 118, and 186 supra and accompanying text.
204 See F. O'NEAL, supra note 60, §§ 3.01-3.02.
205 Professor O'Neal favors the term "squeeze-out." F. O'NEAL, supra note 60, § 1.-1.
206 F. O'NEAL, supra note 60, § 1.01. See generally Note, supra note 102.
207 F. O'NEAL, supra note 60, § 3.02. See generally Note, supra note 102.
208 See note 204 supra. Cases such as Alaska Plastics, Inc., v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270
(Alaska 1980); Gay v. Gay's Supermarkets, Inc., 343 A.2d 577 (Me. 1975); Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich.
459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919); Miller v. Magline, Inc., 76 Mich. App. 284, 256 N.W.2d 761
(1977); Gottfried v. Gottfried, 73 N.Y.S.2d 692 (Sup. Ct. 1947); and Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983), illustrate combinations of several freeze-out
techniques.
209 F. O'NEAL, supra note 60, § 9.04.
210 See Polikoffv. Dole & Clark Bldg. Corp., 37 Ill. App. 2d 29, 37, 38, 184 N.E.2d 792,
796 (1962); see also Zidell v. Zidell, Inc., 277 Or. 413, 418, 560 P.2d 1086, 1089 (1977). In
addition, the result, if not the language, of Dilaconi v. New Cal Corp., 97 N.M. 782, 643
P.2d 1234 (1980), supports this view.
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duct into a tight, formalistic pattern. This pattern makes challenging such conduct more difficult and thus makes oppressive conduct
more attractive. Ordinarily, a shareholder will find a derivative action neither available nor attractive. Injury to the corporation will
often be difficult to show.2 1 1 If injury can in fact be shown, a corporate recovery will primarily benefit the majority shareholders. Such
a distribution of the recovery would make a derivative lawsuit
2 12
undesirable.
Furthermore, under the rule, the plaintiff must show bad faith,
fraud, or abuse of discretion.2 13 Because the defendants usually
can identify at least a colorable business purpose for any action, the
plaintiff has a considerable burden. Ordinarily, the plaintiff has difficulty establishing that the defendants' primary purpose was to
eliminate the plaintiff's interest. 21 4 In addition, the plaintiff encounters similar problems with the main method to avoid the business judgment rule-proving self-dealing by the directors. The
alleged self-dealing must be well proven. The appearance of selfdealing, however, often can be avoided by techniques such as for2
mal abstention by "interested" directors. 15
Not surprisingly, several courts and commentators have criticized the use of the business judgment rule in freeze-out situations. 2 16 The danger, however, is not universally acknowledged,
nor do the cases suggest that courts will always recognize a freezeOUt. 2 17 Of course, inconsistency inevitably occurs as equitable principles are applied to the unique facts of each case. 2 18 Nonetheless,
211 Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 579 n.4, 589 n.14, 328 N.E.2d
505, 508 n.4, 513 n.14 (1975).
212 Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 11, at 41 n.132.
213 See notes 20-32 supra and accompanying text.
214 See Cohn, supra note 25, at 593-94; Note, supra note 104, at 1269; Note, supra note
102, at 1638.
215 Stockholders' Duty, supra note 176, at 426 n.28. See, e.g., Miller v. Magline, Inc., 76
Mich. App. 284, 256 N.W.2d 761 (1977). Sometimes a court refuses to acknowledge the
apparent existence of self-dealing, as in Dilaconi v. New Cal Corp., 97 N.M. 782, 643 P.2d
1234 (1982), or its likely existence, as in Lussier v. Mau-Van Dev., Inc., 667 P.2d 804 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1983). Cf. Note, supra note 104, at 1269.
216 As expressed by the court in Wilkes: "This 'freezeout' technique has been successful
because courts fairly consistently have been disinclined to interfere in those facets of internal corporate operations, such as the selection and retention or dismissal of officers, directors and employees, which essentially involve management decisions subject to the
principle of majority control." 370 Mass. at 842, 353 N.E.2d at 662. See also Exadaktilos v.
Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141, 400 A.2d 554 (Law Div. 1979), afr'd, 173 NJ.
Super. 559, 414 A.2d 994 (App. Div. 1980); Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 307
S.E.2d 551 (1983); F. O'NEAL, supra note 60, § 9.04; Note, supra note 104, at 1253, 1269;
Stockholders' Duty, supra note 176, at 424-26.
217 The factual patterns in cases such as DiIaconi, Nanfito, Miller, Gottfried, Gay, and Alaska
Plastics all strongly suggest the existence of a freeze-out.
218 For example, the frequently mentioned requirement that a plaintiff show "bad faith"
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use of the rule contributes to these inconsistent results and simultaneously hinders meaningful judicial review in this area.
C. Identifying The Problem: The BusinessJudgment Rule's
Justifications and Assumptions
The business judgment rule should apply to the close corporation only to the extent that the traditional assumptions and rationales for the rule justify its use.2 19 But these assumptions and
justifications rarely apply in the closely held corporation. As a result, the rule should have an extremely limited role in the close
corporation.
1. Justifications
The traditional justifications include the belief that the rule reassures capable managers; 220 the conviction that managers should
be encouraged to take risks;221 the notion that judges are not busi-

ness experts; 222 and the concern for the efficient operation of business and the courts 223

a. Reassuring capable managers
One of the attributes of the close corporation is the identity of
management and ownership.2 24 If the owners also manage the corporation, reassuring the management seems unnecessary and useless. This identity of management and ownership also undercuts
the assumption that fear of managerial liability deters insiders such
as principal shareholders and key employees from serving on the
board.2 25 Instead, the need to reassure potential managers and directors should arise only if outsiders are involved. In fact, in a close
corporation the board of directors normally represents only a legal
formality. Service on the board, therefore, seldom causes great
2 26
concern or requires lengthy consideration.
b.

Encouraging Risk-Taking
Intelligent risk-taking is as desirable and necessary in the close

or "oppression" to defeat a facially valid corporate transaction inevitably implicates equitable principles.
219 Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983);
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812-13 (Del. 1984). Cf. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430
A.2d 779, 787, 788-89 (Del. 1981).
220 See note 45 supra. See generally notes 41-46 supra and accompanying text.
221 See note 44 supra.
222 See note 41 supra.
223 See note 46 supra.
224 See notes 79-83 supra and accompanying text.
225 Cary & Harris, supra note 34, at 65.
226 O'Neal, supra note 80, at 880-82.
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corporation as in the publicly held corporation. Presumably, however, the business judgment rule should encourage only businessrelated risks. 2 27 Non-business motivations abound in a close corporation and often avoid detection. Thus a given management decision may not represent a true business-related risk.2 28
As with the desire to reassure capable managers, this justification assumes that fear of liability significantly affects a manager's
decision-making process. The realities of the close corporation,
however, undermine that assumption's validity. If the principal
shareholders are also the managers, the principals already recognize the risk of economic failure. Potential legal liability therefore
is arguably ignored in the decision-making process.
c. Judicial Inability to Review Business Decisions
Recent cases involving the use of special litigation committees
in derivative suits have undermined the traditional view that judges
are not capable of reviewing business decisions. Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado,229Joy v. North,230 and similar cases indicate a new judicial willingness to substantively review business judgments.2 3 1 Professor O'Neal has suggested that a court has less reason to question
its substantive expertise in business matters in the close corporation context. 2 32 The problems are generally not as complex as in a
large publicly held corporation. In Zapata, the Delaware Supreme
Court captured the general unease with Professor O'Neal's suggestion in its comment that "under our system of law, courts and not
litigants should decide the merits of litigation." 2 33
d.

Concernfor Efficiency
The danger for abuse of the derivative lawsuit is widely recog-

227 The business judgment rule "does not apply in cases . . .in which the corporate
decision lacks a business purpose ..
"Joy v. North, 692 F.2d at 886. The rule, after all,
protects businessjudgments. See notes 123-25 supra and accompanying text. Dodge v. Ford
Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919), illustrates this point. The Dodge court
viewed Henry Ford's decision to suspend dividend payments indefinitely as motivated by
political and economic goals unrelated to the business of making and selling automobiles.
See notes 119-25 supra and accompanying text.
228 See notes 124-25 supra and accompanying text. The close connection between dividends, compensation, and employment exacerbates the danger. The typical fact pattern of
a freeze-out illustrates the problem. When do facially valid corporate actions mask nonbusiness related motives?
229 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
230 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
231 See notes 62-71 supra and accompanying text.
232 F. O'NEAL, supra note 60, § 9.04.
233 430 A.2d at 789 n.18 (quoting decision below, 413 A.2d 1251, 1263 (Del. Ch.
1980)).
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nized. 234 Using the business judgment rule to favor the defendant
may discourage frivolous complaints.235 With a smaller pool of potential plaintiffs, however, the danger of ill-founded lawsuits for the
close corporation is ordinarily less severe than for the publicly held
corporation. 36 Often close corporation shareholders lack the incentive to file a derivative lawsuit because the bulk of any recovery
usually will accrue, directly or indirectly, to the alleged wrongdoers
in their capacity as majority shareholders. 237 Furthermore, a derivative suit for a close corporation generally will be less complex, and
238
therefore less costly and less time-consuming to defend.
2.

Assumptions

a.

Independence

The business judgment rule presumes independent judgment
and therefore is properly invoked only when the directors or officers involved are disinterested. 239 In the close corporation, however, the assumption of independence may be invalid. When the
owners also serve as employees and as directors, potential conflicts
of interest are always present. 240 As a result, personal interest often
is not separated from the corporate welfare. 24 ' Because of the principals' tripartite identity, 24 2 conflicts can arise over compensation,

other employment matters, dividend policy, or a myriad of other
234 See, e.g., W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 1, at 887; H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER,
supra note 1, at 1039.
235 Arsht, supra note 6, at 95.
236 F. O'NEAL, supra note 60, § 9.04.
237 Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 11, at 41 n.132. Ordinarily, the recovery from a
shareholder derivative suit goes to the corporation. Id. In certain circumstances, however,
pro rata distribution of the recovery to the shareholders is allowed. Grenier, ProrataRecovery by Shareholders on Corporate Causes of Action as a Means ofAchievingJustice, 19 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 165, 167 (1962). In a close corporation, the benefit of such a pro rata distribution
would inure primarily to the majority shareholders.
238 F. O'NEAL, supra note 60, § 9.04. By definition the set of potential plaintiffs is relatively small in a close corporation. Class actions, therefore, and the problems associated
with them would not be expected. There may also be fewer causes of action which can be
asserted. For example, a closely held corporation will ordinarily not be subject to the reporting requirements imposed by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Thus, complying
with proxy regulations and the strictures of § 16(b) is not likely to be a problem. Furthermore, liability under § 11 or § 12(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 is also unlikely because a
closely held corporation ordinarily will not have undergone the registration process outlined in § 5 of the 1933 Act. But see Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 11, at 16 n.42
(enforcement costs are likely to be high in the close corporation because of the increased
likelihood of friction between the parties).
239 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, supra
note 1, at 661; Arsht, supra note 6, at 115-18.
240 F. O'NEAL, supra note 60, § 9.04.
241 Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill. 2d 16, 27, 203 N.E.2d 577, 583-84 (1965).
242 This identity is as shareholders, employees, and directors. See F. O'NEAL, supra note
60, § 9.04; Note, supra note 104, at 1256.
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issues. Controlling shareholders usually have the power to manipulate corporate decisions for their personal benefit.
The business judgment rule evolved from the publicly held
243
corporation where management is separate from ownership.
The rule is thus based on the perception that independent managers, rather than the courts or shareholder-managers, best serve
shareholders' interests. 244 This perception suggests that the business judgment rule should not apply to the close corporation.
b.

External Controls on Management Conduct
The business judgment rule assumes that external factors regulate management conduct and make judicial deference appropriate. Unlike their counterparts in the close corporation, officers and
directors in a publicly held corporation typically encounter numerous restraints on their behavior. For example, the federal securities
laws restrict short swing trading by insiders of publicly held corporations 245 and require periodic reporting and disclosure of basic
corporate information. 246 By providing additional means of encouraging responsible conduct by officers and directors, federal securities regulation theoretically supports reliance on the business
judgment rule.2

47

In addition, the pressures of the marketplace ap-

preciably affect the conduct of management in a publicly held company. Poorly managed companies with faltering stock prices
become vulnerable to various takeover attempts when the stock is
perceived to be undervalued. 248
However, the value of the derivative lawsuit as a regulator of
management conduct is even more doubtful in the close corporation than it is in the publicly held corporation. 249 Ratable distribution to the shareholders lessens the incentive for a close
2 50
corporation shareholder to sue derivatively.
243 See note 83 supra. The definitive history of the business judgment rule remains to be
written. A useful synopsis of its development can be found in Arsht, supra note 6, at 97-100.
Most of the pivotal cases have involved publicly held corporations.
244 "The fundamental premise of the business judgment rule is that shareholders' welfare is maximized if business decisions are made by managers rather than by courts or
shareholders." Fischel, supra note 11, at 937-38. In the close corporation, business decisions are made by shareholders who are also managers.
245 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1982) (§ 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
246 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1982) (§ 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). See note 238
supra.

247 Note, supra note 104, at 1253, 1254. Cf. Watts v. Des Moines Register & Tribune,
525 F. Supp. 1311, 1326 (S.D. Iowa 1981).
248 Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 11, at 40.
249 The utility of the derivative lawsuit as a regulator of corporate conduct continues to
be questioned. See Manne, supra note 10, at 272 (derivative lawsuits can only be used to
police egregious wrongdoing). See also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 n.5, 812 (Del.
1984) (director liability "is predicated upon concepts of gross negligence").
250 Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 11, at 41 n.132. See note 237 supra.
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Existence of Alternative Remedies

The business judgment rule's relaxed review is appropriate
2
only if aggrieved shareholders have an alternative to litigation. 51
In a publicly held corporation, a dissatisfied shareholder can simply
sell his shares. The shareholder in a close corporation, however,
does not have this option because no market typically exists for the
25 2
stock.
The illiquidity of investment in the close corporation suggests
two related conclusions. First, illiquidity makes freeze-outs more
effective by removing the control group's incentive to compromise. 2 53 Second, the absence of an efficient, nonjudicial remedy to
perceived oppressive conduct militates against the use of the business judgment rule's relaxed standard of review. A court has less
reason to rely on the rule when an aggrieved shareholder's only
2 54
recourse is litigation.
Thus, the business judgment rule obscures judicial analysis
and contributes to oppression in the close corporation. Fundamentally, however, the business judgment rule simply should not apply
to the close corporation. The basic justifications and assumptions
underlying the business judgment rule cannot be transferred automatically from the publicly held to the close corporation model.
The courts should refrain from applying the business judgment
rule to close corporations and should find a suitable replacement
for this venerable principle.
III.
A.

Alleviating the Stress
Statutory Solutions

1. The Shortcomings of the Statutes
State statutes have not effectively addressed the problems of a
close corporation minority shareholder. Existing statutes typically
permit, but never require, a court of equity to order dissolution
when one or more shareholders petition and prove the existence of
251 See notes 48-49 supra and accompanying text.
252 See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 11, at 5-6; Manne, supra note 10, at 280-81;
Note, supra note 8, at 568-70; notes 81-82 supra. The cases reflect a steadily developing
awareness of the illiquidity problem in the close corporation. See, e.g., Alaska Plastics, Inc.
v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 273, 277 (Alaska 1980); Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill. 2d 16, 27, 203
N.E.2d 577, 583-84 (1965); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 591, 599,
328 N.E.2d 505, 514, 518 (1975); Darvin v. Belmont Indus., Inc., 40 Mich. App. 672, 677,
199 N.W.2d 542, 544 (1972); Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141,
152, 400 A.2d 554, 560 (Law. Div. 1979), aff'd, 173 N.J. Super. 559, 414 A.2d 994 (App.
Div. 1980); Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 291, 307 S.E.2d 551, 559 (1983).
253 Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 273, 274 (Alaska 1980). See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 11, at 43.
254 Manne, supra note 10, at 280-81; Note, supra note 7, at 568-70.
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certain conditions. 255 In addition to recognizing the minority
shareholder's perilous position, however, the statutes should deshareholder to relief
scribe the circumstances entitling an aggrieved
2 6
and should specify the available relief. Although virtually every state has some statutory provision enabling a court to order dissolution, 257 the standards for seeking and
obtaining relief vary widely. The threshold requirements for seeking relief range from "any shareholder" to fifty percent ownership, 258 and the requirements for obtaining relief differ. In general,
the qualifications for relief are demanding. 259 Usually the plaintiff
must show "oppression" or "oppressive conduct" to obtain relief.260 These terms have eluded definition and have inspired both
narrowly and broadly phrased descriptions. The descriptions, however, are usually tailored to the specific factual setting. 261 A few
states have established a different standard and have authorized the
courts to order dissolution if "reasonably necessary for the protec262
tion of the rights and interests" of one or more shareholders.
On the whole, the various statutes at best offer uncertain relief.
Prospective plaintiffs rarely know if the often cryptic statutory language would apply to their situation. In addition, involuntary dissolution statutes are usually construed narrowly. 263 Relief under
these statutes is neither frequent nor predictable, particularly for
255

The statutes are collected in Note, supra note 86, at 1129-35. Cf. Hetherington &

Dooley, supra note 11, at 17 nn.45-48.
256 The cases illustrate the many ways minority interests can be injured. Frequently
withheld dividends and loss of company employment, either alone or in combination, cause
injury. Other causes include the issuance of additional stock, the selective repurchase of
outstanding stock, dismissal of derivative litigation, and merger with another corporation.
See notes 190-95 supra and accompanying text. Cf. F. O'NEAL, supra note 60 (chapters 3-6).
257 Note, supra note 86, at 1147.
258 North Carolina, for example, simply permits "a shareholder" to sue for appropriate
relief, including dissolution. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125, 125.1 (1982). Ohio requires a 50%
interest in order to seek dissolution. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.91 (Page 1978). Various other threshold requirements are summarized in In re Topper, 107 Misc. 2d 25, 31-32,
433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 364 (Sup. Ct. 1980) and in Hetherington & Dooley, supra note I1, at 17
nn.45-48.
259 Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 11, at 18-19; Note, supra note 86, at 1123.
260 F. O'NEAL, supra note 60, § 7.15; Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 11, at 17 n.45;
Note, supra note 86, at 1129, 1132.
261 Note, supra note 86, at 1135-39. Oppressive conduct, for example, has been described as "a visible departure from the standards of fair dealing," Ski Roundtop, Inc. v.
Hall, 658 P.2d 1071, 1080 (Mont. 1983); as distinct from illegal or fraudulent conduct, on
the order of "burdensome, harsh, and wrongful conduct," Baker v. Commercial Body
Builders, Inc., 264 Or. 614, 628, 507 P.2d 387, 393-94 (1973); as involving a test similar to
that used in breach of fiduciary duty cases, Masinter v. WEBCO Co., 262 S.E.2d 433, 440
(W. Va. 1980); or as implicating a "reasonable expectations" test, In re Taines, 111 Misc. 2d
559, 564-65, 444 N.Y.S.2d 540, 543-44 (Sup. Ct. 1981).
262 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800(b)(5) (West 1977); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 1104a(b)(2) (McKinney Supp. 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-125(a)(4) (1982).
263 Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 11, at 18-19, 31-32; Note, supra note 86, at 1123.
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minority interests.

In fact, a dissolution proceeding may be

2 64
brought under these statutes primarily to facilitate a buy-out.

The current dissolution statutes and the business judgment
rule are interrelated. The rule condones facially neutral corporate
actions, obscures the underlying dynamics of the situation, and thus
2 65
makes a showing of oppression more difficult.
2.

"No Fault" Withdrawal

Several years ago, Professors Hetherington and Dooley proposed a simple, yet radical, statutory solution to eliminate the morass of involuntary dissolution statutes. 266 Starting with the
premise that illiquidity allows exploitation of the minority shareholder, Hetherington and Dooley argued that shareholders in a
closely held corporation should have the right to resell their shares
to the corporation at any time. 26 7 Shareholders should be entitled
268
by statute to a "no fault" buy-out at "fair value."

In a sense, the proposal was the culmination of the argument
first advanced by Israels that the perpetual existence of close corporations should be re-examined.2 69 The proposal provoked much
criticism. 2 70 The proposal's central tenet proved problematic. The

thesis assumes that the close corporation is the "functional

271
equivalent" of a partnership in every significant way but one.

That one exception is the illiquidity of the minority investment in a
close corporation. In contrast, absent agreement otherwise, a dis27 2
gruntled partner can dissolve a partnership at will.

This thesis implies that the other traditional distinctions between the two forms of business organization, such as limited liability and transferability of interests, are insignificant. If this were
true, the close corporation form, compared to the partnership,
264 Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 11, at 32-35.
265 See notes 201-18 supra and accompanying text. A "freeze-out" is not necessarily "oppressive conduct." The most obvious manifestation of oppressive conduct, however, is the
freeze-out.
266 See generally Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 11.
267 See id. at 50.
268 See id. at 51-52.
269 See generally Israels, supra note 79.
270 See, e.g., In re Reading Co., 551 F. Supp. 1205, 1219 (E.D. Pa. 1982), rev'd, 711 F.2d
509 (3d Cir. 1983); Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 287-90, 307 S.E.2d 551, 557-58
(1983); Hilman, The Dissatisfied Participantin the Solvent Business Venture: A Considerationof the
Relative Permanence of Partnershipsand Close Corporations, 67 MINN. L. REv. 1, 72-75 (1982);
Klein, The Modern Business Organization: BargainingUnder Constraints, 91 YALE LJ. 1521, 1550
n.99 (1982).
271 Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 11, at 2-3.
272 Id. "The position of the minority in the close corporation is as unique as it is precarious: no other form of business organization subjects an owner to the dual hazards of a
complete loss of liquidity and an indefinite exclusion from sharing in the profitability of the
firm." Id. at 6.
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would represent only a trap for the unwary investor. In any event,
the no-fault withdrawal proposal suffers from a more practical
shortcoming: no state legislature has enacted such a statute. Thus,
the proposal has yet to be tested.
3.

Other Statutory Relief

The business judgment rule presumes that good-faith managerial decisions should be sheltered from liability. Would discarding
this presumption require substituting statutory protection? Discarding this presumption may increase the risk of personal liability
for officers and directors.
Insurance and indemnification, however, would still reassure
management. Most state corporation codes expressly authorize the
273
use of insurance and indemnity for officers and directors.
Although cost is a consideration, such arrangements are equally
available to the managers of closely held corporations as well as
publicly held organizations.274

B.

Shareholders' Agreements

The shareholders' agreement is probably the most frequently
mentioned "remedy" for aggrieved minority shareholders in the
close corporation. Commentators and the courts have debated the
utility and desirability of shareholders' agreements. 275 The idea is
certainly appealing. This theoretical arms-length contract would
specify the understanding and undertakings of the parties and
would stipulate a dispute-resolution process. Such a contract may
well provide faster and more certain relief than does protracted and
expensive litigation. Indeed, a shareholders' agreement may give
the minority shareholder in a close corporation a position prefera276
ble to that of his counterpart in the publicly held corporation.
At best, however, a shareholders' agreement is preventive
medicine. If an agreement does not exist at the time the dispute
arises, this "remedy" will be useless. A shareholders' agreement
would not be drafted in the midst of a dispute. Shareholders'
agreements, however, are not routinely prepared when a close cor2 77
poration is formed or reorganized.
273 See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 1, at 960; H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra
note 1, at 1144.
274 See 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 105, § 3.67.
275 See Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill. 2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1965); H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER,
supra note 1, at 778-81; F. O'NEAL, supra note 60, §§ 2.17, 8.05.
276

Brudney & Clark, A New Look at Corporate Opportunities, 94 HARV. L. REV. 997, 1031

n.107 (1981).
277 See In re Topper, 107 Misc. 2d 25, 33, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 365 (Sup. Ct. 1980); Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 290, 307 S.E.2d 551, 558 (1983); Hetherington, Special
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Even when such agreements are prepared, minority interests
often are not adequately protected. Minority interests, by definition, hold a weak bargaining position. Any agreement between the
majority and the minority shareholders would reflect this imbalance. Typically, one attorney handles all the legal aspects of incorporation. Therefore, a shareholders' agreement, if drafted, may
not greatly protect the minority interests.278
In addition, such an agreement may well be inartfully drafted
or incomplete because a well-written shareholders' agreement requires considerable time and effort. Indeed, a comprehensive
agreement may not be a realistic objective considering the myriad
disagreements that may arise. 279 Furthermore, not every situation
is conducive to the preparation of a shareholders' agreement.
Rarely would a minority shareholder demand, much less receive, a
shareholders' agreement if the shares were acquired by inheritance
or gift or an employer's offer. 2 0
In light of these considerations, a minority shareholder cannot
be said to assume the risk of oppression by not initially insisting on
a shareholders' agreement. In fact, the people who need shareholders' agreements the most may actually benefit from them the
8
least.2 '

This discussion implicitly suggests the principal reasons why a
shareholders' agreement is not an adequate "remedy." Individuals
acquire minority interests in many ways, and expectations may
change. This combination makes anticipating and providing for future problems particularly difficult, even for the most conscientious
drafter.28 2 Moreover, because the success of the close corporation
depends so heavily on the continued good will and close cooperation of the parties, a shareholders' agreement is of limited value.2 83

In short, the usefulness of a shareholders' agreement, either as a
Characteristics,Problems and Needs of the Close Corporation, U. ILL. L.F. 1, 17-18 (1969). See also
Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 11, at 38 n.121; O'Neal, supra note 80, at 881.
278 Hetherington, supra note 277, at 17-19.
279 See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 11, at 37-38; O'Neal, supra note 80, at 881;
Stockholder's Duty, supra note 176, at 425-26 n.26.
280 See Meiselman, 309 N.C. at 291, 307 S.E.2d at 558-59; Hetherington, supra note 277,
at 17-18.
281 See, e.g., Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983); Hetherington & Dooley,
supra note 11, at 36; Hetherington, supra note 277, at 16-19; O'Neal, supra note 80, at 881.
282 Professors Hetherington and Dooley state:
Such comprehensive private arrangements call for legal services of an extent and
kind not likely to be available to small businessmen. Even if such services were
available, something is fundamentally wrong with a system that requires sophisticated, complex, and costly organizational arrangements for what are usually the
least sophisticated business ventures.
Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 11, at 38.
283 Id. at 2.
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preventive measure or as a remedy, should not be overemphasized.
C. JudicialSubstitutesfor the Business Judgment Rule
The business judgment rule presently forms the basis for judicial analysis of corporate litigation. The rationale of numerous
cases begins with this principle. If the rule were discarded, another
judicial doctrine would have to provide this analytical "starting
point." No statutory or contractual substitute appears acceptable.
1. The "Intrinsic Fairness" Inquiry
Traditional corporate law theory holds that the business judgment rule does not apply if "interest" on the part of officers and
directors is shown. 2 84 The existence of conflicting loyalties may
have undermined the ability of the accused officers and directors to
reach an independent decision. The inquiry therefore focuses on
the "intrinsic fairness" of the challenged transaction. 28 5
If the business judgment rule were discarded in cases involving
close corporations, an obvious substitute would be the intrinsic
fairness test. As true independence rarely, if ever, exists in the
close corporation, 28 6 such a substitution would not be implausible
or fortuitous. In fact, the norm in close corporations may be conflicting interests, whether obvious or subtle.
Would automatic application of the intrinsic fairness standard
result in an analysis different from that under the business judgment rule? One commentator has suggested that the two analyses
do not differ significantly. 28 7 In theory, however, if not in practice,
the operation of the two tests differs. The business judgment rule
establishes a presumption in favor of management decisions
284
285

See notes 38-39 supra and accompanying text.
As the Delaware Chancery court explains:
[W]hen the persons, be they stockholders or directors, who control the making of
a transaction and the fixing of its terms, are on both sides, then the presumption
and deference to sound business judgment are no longer present. Intrinsic fairness, tested by all relevant standards, is then the criterion.
DavidJ. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 430-31 (Del. Ch. 1968). See also
Polin v. Conductron Corp., 552 F.2d 797 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 857 (1977); Zapata
Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981); Shlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp., 19
Ill. 2d 268, 166 N.E.2d 793 (1960); Arsht, supra note 6, at 115-16.
The business judgment rule can be avoided by a showing other than "interest." Lack
of good faith or an inability to establish a rational basis for the challenged decision, for
example, will also render the rule inapplicable. See notes 38-39 supra and accompanying
text. Regardless of the means employed, the common result is loss of the presumption in
favor of the managerial decision and also a shift in the burden of proof.
286 See notes 239-44 supra and accompanying text.
287 Brudney & Chirelstein, FairShares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REV.
297, 318 n.49 (1974).
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reached in good faith. 28 8 Once the defendants have made a minimal showing, the burden of proof rests squarely on those challenging such decisions. 289 In contrast, the intrinsic fairness test, in
effect, shifts the burden of proof to the defendants. 290 The
differ291
ence in burden of proof often has practical significance.
Substituting the intrinsic fairness standard would complement
the skeptical attitude, expressed in cases such as Zapata Corp. v. iVMaldonado,292 about the use of the business judgment rule and special
litigation committees. In Zapata, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that such a committee must initially prove its independence,
its good faith, and its performance of a reasonable investigation
before the court will entertain a motion to dismiss a shareholder
derivative suit. 293 To reach that conclusion, the court analogized
"demand-excused" derivative suits to "interested director" transactions where the defendant-directors must prove the intrinsic fairness of the transaction. 294 The common thread is the existence of
reasonable doubts about the independence of management. If independence cannot be presumed, an intrinsic fairness inquiry is
appropriate. 295
The advantages of this substitute test are easily identifiable.
First, the test represents a refinement of a familiar type of review.
Second, the use of such a test should strengthen an aggrieved
shareholder's bargaining position by making the threat of litigation
more serious.
This substitution, however, would have disadvantages. First,
increasing the seriousness of the threat of a derivative suit is both
an advantage and a disadvantage. Second, the types of behavior
that trigger the intrinsic fairness standard have been narrowly defined. The conflicting interests ordinarily need to be egregious. 296
Third, the term "fairness" is no more specific than "good faith" or
"fiduciary duty." Like so many terms in this area, "fairness" defies
precise definition. 297
Moreover, to whom must a challenged transaction or decision
288 See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
289 See notes 21-36 supra and accompanying text.
290 See note 285 supra.
291 Polin v. Conductron Corp., 552 F.2d 797, 809 n.42 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
857 (1977).
292 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
293 Id. at 788.
294 Id. at 788 n.17.
295 The lack of disinterested, independent judgment is the critical fact. The key effect of
the "intrinsic fairness" test is to shift the burden of proof from the plaintiffs to the
defendants.
296 Stockholders' Duty, supra note 176, at 426 n.27.
297 See D. VAGTS, BASIC CORPORATION LAWv 272-73 (1979). See also H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 639.
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be "intrinsically fair"? To the corporation? To minority shareholders? To all shareholders? Or to both the corporation and its
shareholders? The case law is surprisingly ambiguous on this
point.2 98 When a court invokes the intrinsic fairness standard, it
typically does not identify the object of "fairness." The omission
may not be accidental. The answer to this question, however, alters
the effectiveness of the result. A "fairness" review only to the corporate level in a close corporation will often be meaningless. The
most effective techniques of oppression typically are facially neutral
2 99
and would not adversely affect the corporation.
Instead, the inquiry would have to extend to the individual
shareholders. Such an extension would not be unprecedented.
Courts have occasionally assessed a particular transaction's fairness
to various groups of shareholders, without regard to the effect on
the corporation.3 0 0 This approach, however, is usually employed
when an aggrieved shareholder may assert a direct cause of action,
apart from any derivative claims. Distinguishing between derivative
and direct claims in the close corporation is often difficult.30 1 The
30 2
benefits of making the distinction are equally difficult to identify.
The requirement of a direct action, however, would not present an
obstacle if the aggrieved close corporation shareholder could use
the duty of the majority to the minority shareholder to maintain a
298 See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983); Sinclair Oil Corp.
v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971); Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107,
110 (Del. 1952). See also H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 639; Arsht, supra note 6,
at 115-16. Statutes directed at interested director problems, however, are not as ambiguous. For example, § 144 of the Delaware Corporation Code requires the contract or transaction to be "fair as to the corporation." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(3) (1983). Section

41 (c) of the Model Business Corporation Act requires the contract or transaction to be "fair
and reasonable to the corporation."

MODEL BusINESS CORP. AcT § 41(c) (1979).

299 It is difficult, for example, to show that a nonpublic corporation is injured because
earnings are distributed in the form of salary rather than in the form of dividends. The
situation is much the same with partial or selective repurchase of stock. Unless the corporation's liquidity or solvency is threatened, a repurchase should be a matter of indifference to
the corporation. Zidell v. Zidell, Inc., 277 Or. 423, 427-28, 560 P.2d 1091, 1093 (1977).
300 See, e.g.,Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., I Cal. 3d 93, 105-08, 460 P.2d 464, 470-71,
81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 597-99 (1969); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 58894, 328 N.E.2d 505, 512-16 (1975). The Delaware courts took an analogous approach to
review of cash-out mergers, where a corporation decides to acquire all the outstanding
shares of a subsidiary it does not then own. The "fairness" issue arises when officers or
directors of the parent also sit on the board of the subsidiary and vote for the proposal.
When "fairness" is at issue, the Delaware Supreme Court has indicated that "fairness"
means fairness to the subsidiary's minority shareholders whose shares are being "cashed
out." Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711-14 (Del. 1983).
301 For example, there is no general agreement as to whether an action to compel declaration of dividends-a common close corporation issue-is direct or derivative. H. HENN &
J. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 1051. See also W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 1, at 89699; H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 1044-53.
302 See notes 210-12 supra and accompanying text.
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direct cause of action.30 3
Extending the "fairness" inquiry to individual shareholders
raises new questions. How broad should the inquiry be? Is past
conduct relevant? Should the expectations of the parties be considered? These questions indicate the necessary prerequisites to the
use of such a standard-a consensus on what is "fair" in the close
corporation and on the proper scope of a "fairness" inquiry. That
consensus does not now exist.30 4 The business judgment rule analysis is faulted for reviewing isolated incidents and ignoring an overall pattern of oppression.3 0 5 Unless a consensus is achieved, the
intrinisic fairness test could foster the same problem.
2.

The Duty of the Majority to the Minority

The idea that majority shareholders owe a fiduciary duty to the
minority shareholders has taken hold.3 0 6 Judge Traynor strongly
stated this duty in.Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co.: "The comprehensive rule of good faith and inherent fairness to the minority in any
transaction where control of the corporation is material properly
governs controlling shareholders in this state."3 0 7 While not confined to the close corporation,3 0 8 the majority shareholders' duty
would probably arise in this context. A close corporation would be
more likely to have a majority shareholder or shareholders than
would a publicly held corporation.
The duty of the majority theoretically provides an attractive
way to surmount the usual obstacles to relief, such as the business
judgment rule. For all its apparent appeal, however, the principle
actually has dubious value. The business judgment rule should
arise in cases where management decisions are challenged directly.
In contrast, the duty of the majority would be invoked when, for
whatever reason, a direct challenge to a management decision is
either unavailable or undesirable.3 0 9 Thus, the duty of the majority
303 See note 147 supra and notes 306-13 infra and accompanying text.
304 For instance, there is still considerable support for the notion that a minority shareholder in a close corporation, because of his status, assumes the risk of a freeze-out. As
expressed by the Oregon Supreme Court: "[Ilt
is common knowledge that, as a practical
matter, the stock acquired by one who purchases a 49% interest in a 'close' family corporation, as in this case, is worth considerably less than 49% of the book value of such stock."
Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 264 Or. 614, 637, 507 P.2d 387, 398 (1973).
305 See notes 202-18 supra and accompanying text.
306 2 F. O'NEAL, supra note 105, § 8.07 (cases collected therein).
307 1 Cal. 3d 93, 112, 460 P.2d 464, 474, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 602 (1969).
308 H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 653-60. For example, in Ahmanson, Judge
Traynor did not limit the application of the principle to closely held corporations. See note
307 supra and accompanying text.
309 A facially valid decision of the board of directors to increase employee compensation, for example, or to repurchase stock held by a shareholder, absent clear evidence of
self-dealing, will have little chance of surviving the business judgment rule's counterattack.
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would seem to avoid the presumption of business judgment rule.
In practice, however, no such distinction has emerged. Courts
have instead simultaneously applied the business judgment rule
and the duty of the majority. For example, in Masinter v. WEBCO
Co. ,31 the West Virginia Supreme Court recognized that the majority shareholders owe a basic duty of good faith. The court then
promptly noted that the existence of such a duty "does not mean
that the officers and directors are not accorded a rather broad lati31
tude in the conduct of corporate affairs." '
Thus, the duty of the majority has not developed as a substitute for the business judgment rule. The duty remains an alternative for a court of equity to use in reaching a result seemingly
inconsistent with the business judgment rule. In any event, the
duty of the majority would not be a significant improvement over
the business judgment rule. The duty of the majority could only
partially replace the business judgment rule. The duty of the majority would be irrelevant to allegations of ordinary neglience. Furthermore, the rule's replacement would only be a loosely defined
duty of good faith and fair dealing. Such a duty, as developed by
the courts, would not be more exacting than the fiduciary duty
312
owed by officers and directors to the corporation.
3.

The Analogy to a Partnership

A close corporation and a partnership have several similar
characteristics.3 1 3 The close relationship between ownership and
control and the great importance of cooperation and mutual trust
are the key similarities. 3 14 These similarities prompted the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. 3 1 5 to impose on close corporation shareholders a duty
Likewise, since the recovery in a successfully prosecuted derivative lawsuit ordinarily belongs to the corporation, and not the complaining shareholder, this device will often be
unattractive. The recovery inures primarily to the benefit of the wrongdoers. See notes
211-12 supra and accompanying text.
310 262 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1980).
311 Id. at 438. See also Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 276, 278 (Alaska
1980); Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 850-51, 353 N.E.2d 657,
663 (1976); Zidell v. Zidell, Inc., 277 Or. 413, 418-19, 560 P.2d 1086, 1089 (1977).
312 But see Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 593-94, 328 N.E.2d 505,
515-16 (1975).
313 See Galbreath v. Scott, 433 So. 2d 454, 457 (Ala. 1983); Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309
N.C. 279, 289, 307 S.E.2d 551, 557 (1983); W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 1, at 1819, 366; F. O'NEAL, supra note 105, § 9.02; Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 11, at 1-2;
Hillman, supra note 270, at 65. Contra Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 264 Or.
614, 507 P.2d 387 (1973).
314 Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 288-89, 307 S.E.2d 551, 557 (1983). See F.
O'NEAL, supra note 105, § 9.02; Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 11, at 2; Hillman, supra
note 270, at 65.
315 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975).

1985]

BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE

corresponding to that owed among partners.
The Donahue court adopted the premise that the duty one partner owes to another is more rigorous than the duty directors owe to
shareholders and shareholders owe to each other. The court contrasted the "utmost good faith and loyalty required of partners"
with the "somewhat less stringent standard of fiduciary duty to
which directors and stockholders of all corporations must
31 6
adhere."
Transferring the duty of partners to the shareholders of a close
corportion, the Donahue court allowed the minority shareholders to
resell stock to the corporation on terms equivalent with those accorded to the defendant, the majority shareholder. The court reasoned that the defendant's use of "control" to obtain "special
advantages and disproportionate benefit" violated the duty owed
17
by the shareholders to one another as quasi-partners.3
Although widely noted,3 18 the Donahue approach offers little
improvement over the status quo. The fundamental problems of
defining the duty of partners and distinguishing that duty from the
existing duty in the corporate model remain. The Donahue opinion
did not resolve these problems. Discovering a solution is indeed a
difficult task. Partnership law in general and partners' duties have
not attracted much attention.3 1 9 Furthermore, articulating the difference between duty at the corporate level and duty at the partner3 20
ship level proves particularly frustrating.
The partnership and the close corporation share many similarities. However, as the concurring opinion to Donahue noted,3 2 ' the
two forms are not identical. The traditional distinctions between
the two business forms include the limited liability of shareholders,
the perpetual legal existence of the corporation, the transferability
of shares, and the tax "entity" status of the corporation.3 2 2 In practice, these distinctions may be more theoretical than real.3 23 Yet in
certain situations, these distinctions may have practical significance.
Either transplanting the duty of partners to the close corporation or expanding the duty of the majority to the minority would
316 Id. at 593-94, 328 N.E.2d at 515-16.
317 Id. at 598-99, 328 N.E.2d at 518.
318 See generally Gillerman, The CorporateFiduciary in Massachusetts, 65 MAss. L. REV. 113
(1980); Note, The Strict Good Faith Standard-FiduciaryDuties To Minority Shareholders in Close
Corporations,33 MERCER L. REV. 595 (1982); Stockholders' Duty, supra note 176; Comment, 61
CORNELL L. REV. 986 (1976); Comment, 61 IowA L. REv. 876 (1976); Comment, 21 VILL. L.
REV. 307 (1975).
319 Hillman, supra note 270, at 1.
320 Stockholders' Duty, supra note 176, at 428.
321 367 Mass. at 604, 328 N.E.2d at 521 (Wilkins, J., concurring).
322 R. HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 9-20.
323 Id.
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shift attention from the board of directors to the true focus: the
interaction between the principals. But analogizing the close corporation to a partnership, like expanding the duty of the majority,
would simply replace one inexact and ambiguous set of principles
with another. The partnership analogy thus would not provide a
better method to analyze close corporation litigation.
4.

The "Less Harmful Means" Analysis

One year after Donahue, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts modified its approach to reviewing management conduct
in the close corporation. In Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc. ,324
the court adopted a two step analysis for cases of alleged breach of
duty by majority shareholders. First, the majority must demon5
strate a legitimate business purpose for the offending action. 32 If
the majority shareholder advances either no purpose or an unsatisfactory purpose, the complaining shareholders are entitled to relief.3 26 If a legitimate business purpose is advanced, the
complaining shareholders may demonstrate that the legitimate
business purpose "could have been achieved through an alternative
course of action less harmful to the minority's interest." 3 27 The
court must then "weigh the legitimate business purpose, if any,
3 28
against the practicability of the less harmful alternative."
The Wilkes court characterized its approach as a modest retreat
from Donahue's broadly phrased standards. 329 The court was concerned that "untempered application" of the Donahue standard
might "unduly hamper" the efficient management of the close corporation. 33 0 Thus, the Wilkes court reiterated that courts should
give substantial latitude to management decisions in areas such as
33 1
dividends, compensation, and personnel matters.
The first prong of the Wilkes test tracks the traditional business
judgment rule analysis. Requiring the defendant to initially articulate a legitimate business purpose essentially forces the defendant
to demonstrate a rational basis for the challenged action. The defendant would make such a demonstration to invoke the business
judgment rule in any event. 33 2 Thus, requiring the defendant to
324 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976).
325 Id. at 851-52, 353 N.E.2d at 663.
326 Id.
327 Id.
328 Id.
329 Id.
330 Id.
331 Id.
332 See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1092 (1981); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971). These cases
suggest that a showing of a rational basis for the challenged business decision, in the ab-
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articulate a legitimate business purpose for a challenged corporate
action offers little protection for minority interests.
At best, the legitimate business purpose requirement would
only control the outcome of egregious cases of oppression, such as
in Wilkes. 333 In most cases, a plausible business purpose would not
be difficult to show. 334 The experience of the Delaware courts, culminating in the exasperated abolition of the requirement, is instructive. 33 5 The rise and fall of the business purpose requirement in

cash merger litigation underscores the inadequacy of this approach
as protection for minority shareholders.
In spite of the court's effort to reaffirm the business judgment
rule, the Wilkes approach actually represents a significant departure
from the rule. The opportunity to show a less harmful means to the
legitimate business objective adds a new level of inquiry. Also, a
plaintiff's showing of a less harmful means triggers closer judicial
scrutiny. The court must substantively compare the alternative
means. Such comparisons are unnecessary when the business judgment rule is invoked. Under the business judgment rule, if a rational basis for the decison exists, the court presumes that the
sence of evidence of bad faith or "interest," will be sufficient to invoke the business judgment rule. See also PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNANCE, supra note 4, comment to § 4.01(d) at 6263.
333 Plaintiff Wilkes, along with the three individual defendants, operated a nursing
home. Each of the four shareholders owned 25% of the stock, and each performed services
for the corporation for which compensation was paid. No dividends were paid. In time,
Wilkes and one of the other shareholders had a falling-out. When Wilkes attempted to sell
his shares at appraised value, the other shareholders, acting as directors, cut off Wilkes'
salary. Wilkes was subsequently not re-elected as either an officer or director of the corporation. 370 Mass. at 844-47, 353 N.E.2d at 659-61.
334 See F. O'NEAL, supra note 60, § 3.05; Note, supra note 102, at 1638.
335 In Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977), the majority shareholder engineered a merger solely to eliminate the minority shareholders. The Delaware Supreme
Court held that the merger violated the fiduciary duty owed by the majority to the minority.
If challenged, the majority would thus be required to show a legitimate business purpose
for the merger. Shortly thereafter, in Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., 379 A.2d 1121
(Del. 1977), the court held that a merger made primarily to advance the business purpose
of the majority shareholder satisfied the "business purpose" test of Singer. Then, in Roland
Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979) the court reiterated the continuing vitality
of the business purpose requirement. Singer, Tanzer, and Roland became known as the Singer
trilogy. The Singer trilogy's business purpose test was widely criticized. See, e.g., Fischel,
supra note 11; Weiss, The Law of Take Out Mergers: A HistoricalPerspective, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV.
624, 671 n.300 (1981); Comment, Delaware Reevaluates State-Law Limitations on Take-Out Mergers, 62 N.C.L. REV. 812 (1984). Finally, in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del.
1983), the Delaware Supreme Court threw in the towel. The court discarded the business
purpose requirement, noting that "we do not believe that any additional meaningful protection is afforded minority shareholders by the business purpose requirement [of the Singer
trilogy]." Id. at 715.
There is at least a theoretical link between the cash merger litigation described above
and the Wilkes approach. A merger which lacks a valid business purpose is a sophisticated
freeze-out technique, since it uses control to eliminate minority shareholders. Gabhart v.
Gabhart, 267 Ind. 370, 383, 370 N.E.2d 345, 353 (1977).
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course chosen is acceptable.3 3 6 In effect, under the rule, substantive review stops if the defendant shows a rational basis for the
decision.
Application of the Wilkes approach appears deceptively simple.
The Wilkes court, however, did not have to demonstrate the operation of the less harmful means approach. Instead, the court simply
acknowledged, without elaboration, that comparisons will be necessary.33 7 In Wilkes, the plaintiff prevailed because the defendant did
not advance a legitimate business purpose for the plaintiff's termi33 8
nation as an employee.
Drawing the comparisons necessary under the Wilkes test could
be a formidable task. If, for example, the defendant, the majority
shareholder, advances a legitimate business purpose, and the plaintiff demonstrates an alternative that is much less harmful but
slightly more expensive, should the plaintiff prevail? Consider the
typical situation where a non-employee shareholder sues to have
dividends declared. The defendant majority shareholder asserts
the need to accumulate funds to finance a planned expansion of the
business. The plaintiff minority shareholder replies that such expansion could be financed through bank loans. Who should prevail? The tone of the Wilkes opinion suggests that a court
comparing alternative means should respect the decisions of those
in control. The Wilkes court deemed a "large measure of discretion" appropriate.3 3 9 This "large measure of discretion" seems the
same as the business judgment rule's presumption.
The less harmful means approach, however, would offer an aggrieved shareholder more opportunity to demonstrate his plight
than would the usual operation of the business judgment rule. This
approach would induce a court to consider alternate means to the
corporate objective and thus would result in closer scrutiny of
board actions.
The Wilkes reformulation of the Donahue partnership analogy
has not been tested outside of Massachusetts. 40 In a Montana
336
337

See notes 20-34, 332 supra and accompanying text.
370 Mass. at 852, 353 N.E.2d at 663.

338
339

Id.
Id.

340 Subsequent discussion of Wilkes by Massachusetts courts provides little guidance as
to the mechanics of the test envisioned in Wilkes. For example, in Hallahan v. Haltom
Corp., 7 Mass. App. 68, 385 N.E.2d 1033 (1979), the defendants failed to demonstrate any
legitimate business purpose for discharging the plaintiff minority shareholders from employment. No comparison of alternatives was necessary. In Drury v. Abdallah, 9 Mass.
App. 865, 866, 401 N.E.2d 154, 156 (1980), the court reiterated the observation made in
Wilkes that those in control of the corporation are entitled to a "large range of discretion"
in managing the corporation. The Drury court also implied that the business judgment rule
has done no serious damage in Massachusetts.
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case, Ski Roundtop, Inc. v. Hall,341 the dissent employed an approach
similar to that used in Wilkes. The dissent, however, did not refer to
Wilkes and offered its approach in response to the majority's conclusion that alternate means need not be considered once a legitimate
business purpose is established. 342
5. The "Reasonable Expectations" Approach
Involuntary dissolution statutes provide the principal form of
statutory relief for aggrieved shareholders.3 a3 The weaknesses of
such statutes have been widely noted. 344 Such statutes typically empower a court to order relief upon a finding of oppressive conduct. 34 5 Predictably, a reliable definition of "oppression" has

proved elusive.3 46 A growing number of courts have defined oppression in terms of the reasonable expectations of the parties:
frustration of a party's reasonable expectations results in
"oppression." 3 47
This emphasis on reasonable expectations, long championed
by Professor O'Neal, 348 represents a willingness to treat the close
corporation as a legal entity fundamentally different from the publicly held corporation. The essential difference is that close corporations "are companies based on personal relationships."3 4 9 In
that context, the reasonable expectations of the various parties assume great significance. The reasonable expectations represent the
understanding and assumptions that initially induced the parties to
combine efforts.
In a sense, "reasonable expectations" describes all the conditions and premises a highly comprehensive shareholders' agreement might contain. The parties' reasonable expectations could be
described as an implied multilateral contract among the shareholders.3 5 0 Reasonable expectations typically include assurance of em341
342
343
344

Ski Roundtop, Inc. v. Hall, 658 P.2d 1071 (Mont. 1983).
Id. at 1083.
See notes 255-58 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 255-64 supra and accompanying text; see also F. O'NEAL, supra note 60,

§ 9.09.
345 See note 260 supra and accompanying text.
346 See notes 260-61 supra and accompanying text.
347 See, e.g., O'Donnel v. Marine Repair Serv., 530 F. Supp. 1199, 1207 (S.D.N.Y. 1982);
Capital Toyota v. Gerwin, 381 So. 2d 1038, 1039 (Miss. 1980); Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson
Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141, 154-55, 400 A.2d 554, 561 (Law. Div. 1979), aff'd, 173 NJ.
Super. 559, 414 A.2d 994 (App. Div. 1980); In re Taines, 111 Misc. 2d 559, 564-65, 444
N.Y.S.2d 540, 543 (Sup. Ct. 1981); In re Topper, 107 Misc. 2d 25, 34-35, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359,
365 (Sup. Ct. 1980); Hillman, supra note 270, at 38.
348 F. O'NEAL, supra note 60, §§ 1.01 n.1, 7.15.
349 F. O'NEAL, supra note 60, § 7.15. See notes 125, 314 supra.
350 See, e.g., In re Topper, 107 Misc. 2d at 33-34, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 365: "These reasonable expectations constitute the bargain of the parties in light of which subsequent conduct
must be appraised."
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ployment and participation in management. The expectations are
seldom limited to a right to vote for directors and to participate in
351
dividend distributions.
Courts applying the reasonable expectations analysis have concluded that this analysis prevails over the business judgment rule if
35 3
a conflict arises. 3 52 Thus, in Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co.
and in Meiselman v. Meiselman,3 54 the courts severely criticized the
oppressive potential of the business judgment rule and then discussed the virtues of the reasonable expectations analysis. Similarly, in O'Donnel v. Marine Repair Service,3 55 the court concluded that
a thirty-five percent shareholder could, under the circumstances,
reasonably anticipate equal participation in management and compensation. Furthermore, in In re Topper,35 6 the court noted that
even discharge of a shareholder-employee for cause could disrupt
the shareholder's reasonable expectation of continued employment. The court observed: "Whether the controlling shareholders
discharged petitioner for cause or in their good business judgment
is irrelevant."3 5 7 Thus, the reasonable expectations analysis could
displace the business judgment rule as the method to review facially
35 8
neutral corporate transactions.
Existing case law suggests several generalizations about the
reasonable expectations approach. First, the expectations of all the
principals are relevant, not just the plaintiff's.3 5 9 Second, a party's
expectation will be honored only if it was disclosed to the other
parties. Secret expectations are unenforceable, 360 although the expectations need not be in writing.3 6 1 Third, courts have not limited
expectations in a close corporation to voting for directors and participating in dividends. Assurance of employment, for example,
and participation in management are often part of the reasonable
351 See Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141, 153-54, 400 A.2d
554, 560-61 (Law. Div. 1979), arf'd, 173 N.J. Super. 559, 414 A.2d 994 (App. Div. 1980);
Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 302-03, 307 S.E.2d 551, 565 (1983).
352 Conflicts are, of course, not inevitable. An aggrieved shareholder's petition for relief
triggers a "reasonable expectations" inquiry. Such a petition typically takes the form of a
request for involuntary dissolution of the corporation, as authorized by applicable law. But
otherwise, the business judgment rule operates freely.
353 167 NJ. Super. 141, 154-55, 400 A.2d 554, 561 (Law Div. 1979), aj'd, 173 N.J.
Super. 559, 414 A.2d 994 (App. Div. 1980).
354 309 N.C. 279, 292, 307 S.E.2d 551, 559 (1983).
355 530 F. Supp. 1199 (S.D.N.Y 1982).
356 107 Misc. 2d 25, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
357 Id. at 28, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 362.
358 Cf. F. O'NEAL, supra note 60, § 7.15.
359 See Exadaktilos, 167 N.J. Super. at 154-56, 400 A.2d at 561-62; Topper, 107 Misc. 2d at
33, 35, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 365, 366; Meiselman, 309 N.C. at 314, 307 S.E.2d at 571 (Martin,J.,
concurring).
360 See Meiselman, 309 N.C. at 298, 307 S.E.2d at 563; Hillman, supra note 270, at 77-81.
361 See Topper, 107 Misc. 2d at 33, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 365; Note, supra note 86, at 1143.
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expectations of one or more of the parties. 362 Fourth, expectations
may change over time.3 6 3 And finally, expectations may vary from
3 64

shareholder to shareholder.
Reasonable expectations may vary not only from shareholder
to shareholder, but from corporation to corporation. The reasonable expectations for a specific set of shareholders depends upon
the circumstances surrounding the creation and evolution of that
particular corporation.3 65 Thus, conduct which is oppressive in one
corporation might be unobjectionable in another.
These generalizations suggest the difficulty of identifying a
shareholder's reasonable expectations. This analysis assumes that
"in a close corporation the bargain of the participants is often not
reflected in the corporation's charter, by-laws nor even in separate
signed agreements."3 66 Problems of proof will be inevitable. Oral
testimony about past conduct and past conversations contradicting
the corporate documents will be necessary. In short, parol evidence will not only be unavoidable, but essential. Conceptually,
this analysis would force a court to discover and to reconstruct an
implied contract that the parties theoretically agreed upon at the
corporation's formation and amended over time. This reconstruction must occur without the benefit of a single writing.
Nonetheless, the reasonable expectations analysis has considerable advantages. First, unlike the business judgment rule, this
doctrine is based on and tailored to the attributes of the close corporation.3 67 Second, this approach focuses attention on the relationship of the parties as joint investors in the close corporation
and not on the ritualistic mechanics of board decisions. Third, the
analysis encourages comprehensive review of behavior patterns
over time, rather than cursory inspection of isolated events.
In combination, these benefits lessen the potential for oppression in the close corporation. Thus, the discharge of a one-third
owner in Topper and a forty-six percent owner in Meiselman were actionable under the expanded review of the reasonable expectations
analysis. The review included the role that soured personal relationships played in the attempted freeze-out of the minority shareholders. In both cases, the courts recognized the roadblock the
business judgment rule would have posed to the desired result.368
362 In re Taines, IlII Misc. 2d 559, 565, 444 N.Y.S.2d 540, 544 (Sup. Ct. 1981); Topper,
107 Misc. 2d at 33, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 365.
363 Meiselman, 309 N.C. at 298, 307 S.E.2d at 563.
364 Id.
365 See Topper, 107 Misc. 2d at 33-34, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 365; O'Neal, supra note 80, at 886.
366 Topper, 107 Misc. 2d at 33, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 365.
367 F. O'NEAL, supra note 60, § 7.15. All the reported "reasonable expectations" cases
involve closely held corporations.
368 See notes 354, 356 supra.

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:456

Moreover, the reasonable expectations analysis may promote use of
shareholder agreements reflecting the true "bargain" among the
parties. A prospective majority shareholder, for example, may prefer a detailed statement of the parties' understanding and objectives, prepared at the outset, to the expectations a court might later
reconstruct.
The most unique feature of the reasonable expectations analysis is the lack of a bad faith requirement. At most, the plaintiff is
required to show that he or she was not at fault, not that the defendant acted in bad faith. 3 69 An objective inquiry determines
whether the shareholder's expectations were reasonable and were
frustrated. 3 70 Channeling the inquiry away from assessing fault or
detecting oppressive intent simplifies the court's task. Shifting the
focus from a fault standard also has practical implications. Examining the facts of cases such as Gay, Miller, and Zidell indicates that
detecting fault in this context often proves frustrating and fruitless.
The absence of any bad faith or fault requirement suggests that
the reasonable expectations analysis should prevail over the business judgment rule. If a shareholder's reasonable expectations
have been frustrated, the shareholder has lost the benefit of the
original bargain. 37 ' If the decision to join the enterprise forms part
of the original bargain, the situation resembles that arising from a
change in corporate structure, such as a merger, a consolidation or
a sale of substantially all the corporate assets. 3 72 In the latter situations, dissatisfied shareholders typically may liquidate their investment under an appraisal statute. The dissenting shareholder's
statutory right to a "cash out" originates from the altered nature of
the enterprise.3 7 3 The right does not arise from the business judgment rule. Similarly, the business judgment rule should not affect a
court-ordered dissolution or buy-out 3 74 based on a finding that a
shareholder's reasonable expectations have been frustrated.
The courts in Topper, Exadaktilos, and Meiselman all used an involuntary dissolution statute to reach the reasonable expectations
369 Exadaktilos, 167 NJ. Super. at 155-56, 400 A.2d at 561-62; Mfeiselman, 309 N.C. at
301, 307 S.E.2d at 564.
370 Meiselman, 309 N.C. at 301, 307 S.E.2d at 564. See F. O'NEAL, supra note 60, § 7.15.
371 The analogy to an implied contract is a favorite one of the courts in this area. See
note 350 supra.
372 Such would not necessarily be the case, however, in situations where the plaintiff did
not voluntarily join the enterprise.
373 M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 77-79 (1976). See H. HENN &J.
ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 997-1010.
374 Under the North Carolina statute, the court is empowered to order a buy-out as an
alternative to dissolution. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125.1(a)(4) (1982). See note 377 infra.
Under the New York statute, other shareholders or the corporation itself may elect to
purchase the petitioners' shares at fair value, as an alternative to dissolution. N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 1118(a)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1984).
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standard. In Topper and Exadaktilos, the -courts linked the statute
and the standard through the term "oppressive," as used in the
New York375 and New Jersey 76 statutes. In Meiselman, a construction of the phrase "reasonably necessary for the protection of the
rights and interests of the complaining shareholders"3 77 provided
the link.
No court has yet adopted the reasonable expectations test
without the assistance of a statute. The test, however, does not require such a restriction. In addition, the involuntary dissolution
statutes in virtually every state allow a court to order dissolution or
other relief in its discretion. The connection between the language
of the New York and North Carolina statutes and the concept of
reasonable expectations is not unique. Furthermore, even without
a statute, a disgruntled shareholder may petition for relief other
375

The relevant portion of the New York statute provides:
(a) The holders of twenty percent or more of all outstanding shares of a corporation, other than a corporation registered as an investment company under an act
of congress entitled "Investment Company Act of 1940," no shares of which are
listed on a national securities exchange or regularly quoted in an over-the-counter
market by one or more members of a national or an affiliated securities association, who are entitled to vote in an election of directors may present a petition of
dissolution on one or more of the following grounds: (1) The directors or those in
control of the corporation have been guilty of illegal, fraudulent or oppressive
actions toward the complaining shareholders ....
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 1104-a (McKinney Supp. 1984).
376 The relevant portion of the New Jersey statute provides:
1. The Superior Court, in an action brought under this section, may appoint a
custodian, appoint a provisional director, order a sale of the corporation's stock as
provided below, or enter a judgment dissolving the corporation, upon proof that
(c) In the case of a corporation having 25 or less shareholders, the directors or
those in control have acted fraudulently or illegally, mismanaged the corporation,
or abused their authority as officers or directors or have acted oppressively or unfairly toward one or more minority shareholders in their capacities as shareholders, directors, officers, or employees.
N.J. REv. STAT. § 14A:12-7(I)(c) (Supp. 1984).
377 The relevant portions of the North Carolina statute provide:
The superior court shall have power to liquidate the assets and business of a corporation in an action by a shareholder when it is established that:
(4) Liquidation is reasonably necessary for the protection of rights or interests of
the complaining shareholder.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125(a)(4) (1982).
In any action filed by a shareholder to dissolve the corporation under G.S. 55125(a), the court may make such order or grant such relief, other than dissolution,
as in its discretion it deems appropriate, including, without limitation, an order:
(4) Providing for the purchase at their fair value of shares of any shareholder,
either by the corporation or by other shareholders, such fair value to be determined in accordance with such procedures as the court may provide.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125.1(a)(4) (1982).

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:456

than dissolution.37 8
The reasonable expectations approach could not completely
replace the business judgment rule. Traditional corporate governance principles operate until a shareholder petitions for some form
of relief, such as a buy-out or an involuntary dissolution. Such a
petition would then trigger the reasonable expectations analysis.
The reasonable expectations analysis thus would essentially function as a check on managerial discretion. The analysis focuses on
the effect of management decisions, rather than on the mechanics
of the decision-making process. This analysis would temper the application of the business judgment rule in the close corporation.
The reasonable expectations analysis offers a flexible approach
to the widely varying fact patterns in this area. Each case presents a
different set of shareholder expectations.3 7 9 Such a flexible approach makes predicting the outcome of litigation impracticable.
This uncertainty is the greatest drawback to the analysis. If the focus is the minority shareholder's plight, however, and not the effect
upon corporate governance, then uncertainty may be
advantageous.
6.

Fixed-Term Charters

Perhaps the strongest argument for continued use of the business judgment rule in the close corporation is the lack of any clearly
preferable alternative. Protection of minority shareholders through
greater use of shareholders' agreements is unrealistic. 3 8 0 Statutory
relief on any broad scale is unlikely. The substitution of ambiguous
and comprehensive principles such as the majority's duty to the minority3 8 ' or the duty of partners to one another 38 2 offers little improvement over the use of the business judgment rule.
Introducing an intrinsic fairness test would create definitional
and evidentiary issues. 38 3 How is "fairness" defined and in what
context should "fairness" be assessed? The less harmful means ap378 The general availability of involuntary dissolution statutes has retarded the development of a substantial amount of case law on the subject, particularly in recent years. A
modest body of case law supports, on equitable principles, an aggrieved shareholder's right
to dissolution in appropriate circumstances. Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co., 93 Mich. 97, 53
N.W. 218 (1892), is probably the most frequently cited authority for the principle that
courts of equity have inherent power to order dissolution. See also Alaska Plastics, Inc. v.
Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 274 (Alaska 1980); Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 11, at 7-8;
Note, supra note 86, at 1125-26. This inherent equitable power also enables the court to
order relief less drastic than dissolution when appropriate. Masinter v. WEBCO Co., 262
S.E.2d 433, 439 (W. Va. 1980).
379 See notes 364-65 supra and accompanying text.
380 See notes 277, 283 supra and accompanying text.
381 See notes 309-12 supra and accompanying text.
382 See notes 318-23 supra and accompanying text.
383 See notes 296-305 supra and accompanying text.
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proach deftly shifts the burden of proof back and forth among litigants. Questions remain, however, about the guidelines for the
court's balancing of the interests of the shareholder and the corporation. 384 The balance requires a tradeoff between economic benefit to the corporation and protection of minority interests.
The reasonable expectations analysis offers limited relief in
specific situations. It would not alter the basic governance structure of the closely held corporation, but would present challenging,
if not severe, evidentiary problems. 38 5 Yet one other alternative to
the business judgment rule remains: the fixed-term charter. The
charter would bypass the courts and the legislature and would require relatively little effort to effectuate, even in the preparation of
the incorporation papers.
The strongest argument against the continued use of the business judgment rule is that it facilitates oppression of minority interests.38 6 A great potential for oppression exists in the close
38 7
corporation because of the illiquidity of the minority interest.
The majority thus has no incentive to bargain with the minority after the original investment. 388 The standard practice of endowing a
corporation with perpetual existence 389 makes an accounting in the
future or any other outlet for the minority interest unlikely.
Statutes, however, do not require perpetual life for a corporation. Strictly speaking, perpetual existence is an option which is
invariably chosen. Giving the corporation a fixed-life would provide a minority interest with bargaining power, particularly a minority with a substantial investment. A fixed-life provision in effect
would force the majority to periodically "campaign" in an election
where every vote is significant.
This periodic "election" would create an incentive to bargain
with the minority. A single shareholder could refuse to agree to
renew the corporate status when the term expired and thus could
force a dissolution. This possibility would encourage the majority
shareholders to compromise-and perhaps to select fellow shareholders more carefully at the outset. Thus, the use of limited-life
charters could eliminate some of the problems illiquidity causes for
shareholders in the closely held corporation.
The fixed-term charter could result in dissolution and immediate reincorporation. But this action would pose a less serious
384
385
386
387
388
389
at 18;

See notes 336-42 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 365-66 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 202-18 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 252-54 supra and accompanying text.
See note 253 supra and accompanying text.
See, e.g., W. GARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 1, at 21-22; R.
H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 132.

HAMILTON,

supra note 1,
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threat to a minority shareholder than a potential freeze-out. Dissolution followed by reincorporation would at least allow a newly excluded shareholder to litigate the fair value of the interest, without
the confusion of a debate about the existence of a legitimate business purpose. Furthermore, electing a limited-life charter would be
consistent with the view expressed by a number of commentators
3 90
that a legal judgment is never as efficient as an economic remedy.
The courts would become involved only if the parties disagreed
over fair value. 391
Commentators have proposed and criticized the use of limitedlife charters. Professor Hetherington, for example, argued that a
limited-life charter would not prevent short-term exploitation of
the minority interest. 39 2 The risk of exploitation obviously increases with the length of the term. Thus, prospective minority
shareholders should actively negotiate at the pre-incorporation
stage for a relatively short term. If the majority interest desires a
longer initial period, then the minority should demand concessions
to minimize the increased risk.
Furthermore, existing legislation provides a right to petition
for involuntary dissolution at any time.3 9 3 Such legislation offers a
remedy for shareholders "oppressed" in mid-term. Thus, limitedlife charters would simply complement the current principal means
of protection-shareholders' agreements and involuntary dissolu3 94
tion statutes.
IV.

Conclusion

In many ways, the close corporation is a hybrid of a publicly
held corporation and a partnership. But neither corporate nor
partnership law provides a completely acceptable alternative to the
business judgment rule as applied to close corporations. Traditional corporate law principles, usually designed for publicly held
corporations, inadequately address the issues that arise in close corporations. And the inherent differences between a partnership and
a close corporation should be recognized when a managerial liability is assessed in a shareholder derivative suit.
This article has discussed several alternatives to applying the
390 See, e.g., Fischel, supra note 11, at 937-38; Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 11, at
39.
391 Most dissolutions ordered by courts actually result in buyouts. Hetherington &
Dooley, supra note 11, at 30-31, 33.
392 Id. at 45.
393 See notes 255-60 supra and accompanying text.
394 Perhaps the most basic problem with limited-life charters is a practical one. Who, in
the incorporation process, will propose such an arrangement? It seems unrealistic to believe that minority investors are typically represented by their own attorneys. Perhaps the
attorney who prepares the incorporation papers should recommend this arrangement.
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business judgment rule to close corporations. These alternatives
include statutory "no fault" withdrawal, shareholders' agreements,
the "intrinsic fairness" inquiry, and the majority duty to the minority. Other suggested alternatives are the analogy to a partnership,
the "less harmful means" analysis, the "reasonable expectations"
approach, and the fixed-term charter. Although none is a wholly
satisfactory substitute, the reasonable expectations analysis provides the flexibility necessary to address the special problems of the
close corporation. The analysis acknowledges the importance of
personal relationships in close corporations and provides a suitable
framework in which to determine managerial liability. Although evidentiary problems may arise, the reasonable expectations test
avoids the difficult task of proving bad faith. Among the present
alternatives to the business judgment rule, the reasonable expectations analysis offers the most protection for minority shareholders
in close corporations.

